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STRIKING THE BALANCE: NATIONAL 
SECURITY VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Robert N. Davis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
merican national security law has come full circle.  Be-
tween 1945 and 1978, the intelligence community and the 
executive branch used the national security legal structure to 
monitor organizations and intrude on the civil liberties of 
American citizens.1   Critics argued that the executive branch 
abused its intelligence collection power during the Cold War in 
the name of national security.2  The Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (“FISA”)3 was passed in 1978 after findings that 
intelligence agencies had abused the privacy rights of Ameri-
cans.4   FISA was an attempt to provide greater protection of 
civil liberties by erecting a wall between intelligence collection 
and law enforcement.5  Civil liberties organizations now argue, 
however, that the wall is being eroded by the passage of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
  
 * Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.  Professor Davis 
teaches international security law and policy, is a member of the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Law and National Security and is an active member in the 
United States Navy Reserves.  Professor Davis would like to acknowledge the 
excellent research assistance of third-year law student, Sarah Stork. 
        1. SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK THREE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94–755, at 740 (9th Cong. 2nd Sess. 
1976), The Assassination Archives and Research Center, available at http:// 
www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/contents.htm [hereinafter Church Report 
Book Three]. 
 2. Before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 107th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001) 
(testimony of Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow, The Council on Foreign 
Relations and Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National Security Studies), 
Center for Democracy and Technology, available at http://www.cdt.org/secu 
rity/011003halperin.pdf [hereinafter Halperin Statement]. 
 3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 
Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (1994)). 
 4. Halperin Statement, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5. Halperin Statement, supra note 2, at 2. 
A 
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Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(“USA Patriot Act”).6  
The USA Patriot Act was passed in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.7  Deliberations over the USA 
Patriot Act included five weeks of intense, round-the-clock ne-
gotiations by members of Congress, and congressional oversight 
committees.8  The House vote on the Act was three hundred 
fifty-six for and sixty-six against, and the Senate vote was 
ninety-eight for and one against.9  The Act was signed into law 
on October 26, 2001, over a month after the terrorist attack.10  
The USA Patriot Act was adopted as an effort to strengthen 
national security but some believe it overreaches by sacrificing 
civil liberties for the benefit of national security. 11   
The passage of FISA was a reaction to executive branch 
abuses of civil liberties12 which were made possible by the non-
regulation of surveillance for national security purposes.13  Dur-
ing this period, the executive branch spied on organized crime 
  
 6. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
401(a)). This Act was passed in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 7. See generally Charles Doyle, The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch, Congres-
sional Research Service Report for Congress, at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS 
21203.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).  
 8. The Center for National Security Studies, USA Patriot Act, at 
http://cnss.gwu.edu/~cnss/patriotact.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).  See 
Robert O’Harrow Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node 
=&contentId=A1999-2002Oct22&notFound=true. 
 9. Leon, Citizens Blast Patriot Act, supra note 9.  See also Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 
at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/20011031_eff_usa_patrio 
t_analysis.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).   
 10. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
401 (a)). 
 11. Michael Leon, Citizens Blast Patriot Act Madison Passes Civil Liberties 
Resolution, Counter Punch, at http://www.counterpunch.org/leon1016.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2003). 
 12. Halperin Statement, supra note 2, at 1. 
 13. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see generally Greg-
ory E. Birkenstock, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards 
of Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 846–47 (Feb. 1992) 
[hereinafter Birkenstock]. 
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figures, citizens suspected of having communist ties, and 
Americans who led radical causes.14  The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 led to a flurry of legislative activity, at-
tempting to enhance national security.15  The legislation enacted 
to enhance the structure of the nation’s security provisions in-
cluded, inter alia, the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act,16 and the Homeland Defense Department Act.17  The USA 
Patriot Act, initiated by Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
amended over 15 federal statutes.18  The Attorney General has 
recently spent time defending the USA Patriot Act against 
those who argue that civil liberties are at risk because the Act’s 
provisions have provided such expansive law enforcement pow-
ers to the executive branch.19  These critics argue that the USA 
Patriot Act encroaches on the privacy rights of Americans in the 
name of national security by allowing law enforcement to con-
duct intrusive surveillance of emails, telephone conversations, 
business and library records, and computer use.20 
The political climate at the time FISA was adopted was very 
much like the political climate surrounding the passage of the 
USA Patriot Act in that the safety of the nation and the consti-
tutional rights of citizens were in conflict.  However, it is possi-
ble for national security legislation to protect civil liberties, 
while achieving its national security objectives.  In theory, the 
balance must be struck in a manner that preserves the peace 
and security of the nation while at the same time preserving the 
constitutional rights and civil liberties of all Americans.  In or-
der to achieve the appropriate balance between national secu-
  
 14. Birkenstock, supra note 13, at 847–49.  
 15. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act, at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot (last visited Sept. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act]. 
 16. Aviation Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub.L. 
107–42, 115 Stat. 230, (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2001)). 
 17. Homeland Defense Department Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2002). 
 18. American Library Association, The USA Patriot Act in the Library, at 
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/usapatriotlibrary.html (last visited July 19, 
2002). 
 19. Kevin Johnson & Toni Locy, Patriot Act at Heart of Ashcroft’s Influence, 
USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2003, at 8A. 
 20. David Cole, On the Road with Ashcroft: He’s Trying to Talk Up the 
Patriot Act, but Americans May No Longer be Buying, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 
2003, at 22. 
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rity and civil liberties, creative legislative and security initia-
tives must be pursued and anyone who abuses these new meas-
ures, including individual law enforcement officers or the execu-
tive branch itself, must be held accountable.   
National security and civil liberty interests are not mutually 
exclusive.  We can and must balance both interests appropri-
ately because, in the final analysis, if we cannot secure our na-
tion, civil liberties will mean very little.   
History demonstrates that when the nation is in extremis, 
laws bend.  Several examples prove this point.  President Lin-
coln ordered a blockade of the southern ports and suspended 
the right of habeas corpus during the Civil War.21  During World 
War II, the U.S. ordered the internment of Japanese Americans 
on the West Coast.22  Most recently, during the war on terror-
ism, several American citizens were indefinitely detained by the 
military as “enemy combatants.”23  Precedent supports the gov-
ernment.  During World War II, the federal courts upheld the 
government’s right to hold captured Nazi spies as unlawful en-
emy combatants.24  The Latin maxim, inter arma silent leges is 
often invoked to explain the government’s tendency toward self-
preservation during national emergency.  The phrase means “in 
times of war, the laws are silent.”25  Yet, the laws are not silent, 
nor should they be.  The laws will probably be interpreted to 
support the government’s tendency toward self-preservation 
when a “threat to the nation’s security is real,” but they should 
never be silent altogether.26  
The USA Patriot Act is not perfect; no piece of legislation is.  
However, it is an effort to fix our structure in a way that is in-
tended to make us all safe.  The Act contains sunset provisions 
and will probably need future amendment.27  The USA Patriot 
  
 21. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see generally WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998). 
 22. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). 
 23. Ruth Wedgwood, Lawyers at War, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2003 at A22. 
 24. Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942). 
 25. David G. Savage, Laws Bend in Time of War, Rehnquist Says, L.A. 
TIMES, June 15, 2002, at A22. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Currently, work is being done to amend the USA Patriot Act.  See Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, Draft USA Patriot Act II, at http://www.eff.org/ 
Censorship/Terrorism_militias/patriot2draft.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) 
[hereinafter Draft USA Patriot Act II]. 
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Act is not the answer to terrorism–it is only one of the tools that 
we will use to prosecute the global war against terrorism.  It is 
in the process of winning that war that we will protect the free-
doms that we all cherish. 
This Article will begin with a history of U.S. intelligence 
gathering.  It will discuss four of the key documents that cre-
ated the National Security Agency (“NSA”) and provide for its 
intelligence gathering authority.  These key documents are The 
National Security Act of 1947 (“The National Security Act”),28 
the “Truman Memorandum,”29 Executive Order 12,33330 and 
FISA.  
This Article will then discuss the impact of national security 
legislation on Fourth Amendment Rights by surveying litigation 
under FISA, and will also discuss the anticipated effects of the 
USA Patriot Act.31  It will compare the history of FISA and the 
circumstances surrounding its passage with the circumstances 
leading to the adoption of the USA Patriot Act and will analyze 
the two Acts’ impact on intelligence collection and information 
sharing with law enforcement agencies.   
This Article will conclude by suggesting that the appropriate 
balance between civil liberties and national security is achieved 
only when a nation is free from internal and external threats.  
However, the nation’s security ultimately must be a priority, 
and a condition precedent toward securing civil liberties.  When 
the nation is secure, its people are secure and when a nation is 
under attack, civil liberties become secondary to national secu-
rity. 
  
 28. See generally The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 
(2000). 
 29. Memorandum from Harry S. Truman to Secretaries of State and De-
fense (Oct. 24, 1952), The National Security Agency, available at http://ww 
w.nsa.gov/docs/efoia/released/truman.truman.tif [hereinafter Truman Memo-
randum]. 
 30. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).  
 31. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
401(a)).  
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II. THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
A. The National Security Act of 1947 
After the conclusion of World War II, the President and Con-
gress reorganized the U.S. defense establishment.32  The goal of 
enacting The National Security Act was to provide a compre-
hensive program for the future security of the U.S.33   
The National Security Act created the Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) to replace the War Department with the Departments 
of the Army, Navy and Air Force.34  Additionally, this Act estab-
lished the National Security Council (“NSC”),35 restructured the 
  
 32. Wikipedia Encyclopedia, National Security Act of 1947, The National 
Security Act of 1947, at http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_ Security_ 
Act_of_1947 (last visited Oct. 11, 2002). 
 33. The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).  Section § 
401 entitled “Congressional Declaration of Purpose” accompanying the Act 
provided: 
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a 
comprehensive program for the  future security of the United States; 
to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures 
for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relat-
ing to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, in-
cluding the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (in-
cluding naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the 
Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary 
of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be sepa-
rately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under 
the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to 
provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secre-
tary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to 
provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant com-
mands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to 
eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and 
particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its 
overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide 
more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the De-
partment of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of 
the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and 
for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air 
forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed 
forces nor an overall armed forces general staff. 
Id.  
 34. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).  
 35. Id. § 402. The National Security Council was established by the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 to advise the President regarding domestic, for-
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intelligence community, authorized certain agencies within 
DOD to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies, and 
restricted intelligence sharing with the United Nations.36  The 
Secretary of Defense was also given responsibility, through the 
NSA, for the “continued operation of an effective unified organi-
zation for the conduct of signals intelligence activities. . . .”37   
B. The Truman Memorandum of 1954: The Birth of the Na-
tional Security Agency 
The NSA “coordinates, directs, and performs highly special-
ized activities to protect U.S. information systems and produce 
foreign intelligence information.”38  It performs electronic sur-
veillance, that is, communications listening or monitoring, to 
collect foreign intelligence information for the intelligence 
community, the military and government policymakers.39  This 
highly specialized mission protects information systems of the 
U.S. and produces information about other countries.40  The 
NSA works with the intelligence community, to keep decision 
makers informed and the country secure.41  
  
eign, and military policies relating to national security.  The National Security 
Council is composed of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Sec-
retary of Defense, Director for Mutual Security, Chairman of the National 
Security Resources Board, the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other 
executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the 
Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board. 
Id.  
 36. Id. §§ 401–404(g) (2000).  
 37. Id. §§ 403–405 (2000).  
 38. The National Security Agency, About the National Security Agency, at 
www.nsa.gov/about_nsa.index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 
NSA Website]. 
 39. Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
106th Cong. 1 (Apr. 12, 2000) (statement for the Record of NSA Director Lt. 
Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF), available at www.nsa.gov/releases/DIR_HP 
SC1_12Apr.pdf [hereinafter Hayden Statement].  
 40. See NSA Website, supra note 38. Just two examples of the kinds of 
intelligence provided by the NSA is its Signals Intelligence (SIGNIT) and its 
Information Systems security (INFOSEC) mission. Both of these programs 
have become increasingly significant.  
 41. See The National Security Agency, NSA and the Intelligence Commu-
nity, at http://www.nsa.gov/about_nsa/nsa_role (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).  
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Historically, the NSA operated in secrecy.42  Little was known 
about its mission or structure and much less about its operating 
budget.43 Indeed, one scholar has described the birth of the NSA 
as shrouded in silence.44 Much more information about the NSA 
is now available as a result of provisions contained in Executive 
Order 12,958,45 which requires the declassification of all perma-
nently classified documents 25 years or older.46  As a result of 
this Executive Order, the NSA began a declassification effort 
known as Opendoor.47  At its founding, the perception and real-
ity of the NSA was that it was a unique top secret agency.  That 
perception and reality remain true today, though the NSA is no 
longer cloaked in the impenetrable layers of secrecy that ac-
companied its birth. 
  
 42. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA’S MOST 
SECRET AGENCY 15 (1983) [hereinafter BAMFORD]. 
 43. Staci I. Levin, Who Are We Protecting? A Critical Evaluation of United 
States Encryption Technology Export Controls, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 529, 
552 n.17 (1999). 
 44. See BAMFORD, supra note 42, at 1. James Bamford describes the birth 
of the NSA in the following manner: 
At 12:01 on the morning of November 4, 1952, a new federal agency 
was born.  Unlike other such bureaucratic births, however, this one 
arrived in silence.  No news coverage, no congressional debate, no 
press announcement, not even the whisper of a rumor.  Nor could any 
mention of the new organization be found in The Government Organi-
zation Manual or the Federal Register or the Congressional Record.  
Equally invisible were the new agency’s director, its numerous build-
ings, and its ten thousand employees.  Eleven days earlier, on Octo-
ber 24, President Harry S. Truman scratched his signature on the 
bottom of a seven-page presidential memorandum addressed to secre-
tary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Robert A. 
Lovett.  Classified top secret and stamped with a code word that was 
itself classified, the order directed the establishment of an agency to 
be known as the National Security Agency.  It was the birth certifi-
cate for America’s newest and most secret agency, so secret in fact 
that only a handful in the government would be permitted to know of 
its existence.  Even the date set for its birth was most likely designed 
for maximum secrecy: should any hint of its creation leak out, it 
would surely be swallowed up in the other news of the day—the 
presidential election of 1952. 
Id. 
 45. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).   
 46. Id. at 19,832. 
 47. See The National Security Agency, What’s in the Database, OpenDoor, 
at www.nsa.gov/programs/opendoor/scope.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). 
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The NSA was not established by a statute, but rather by a 
presidential memorandum (“The Truman Memorandum”) ad-
dressed to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense re-
garding communications intelligence activities.48  In his memo-
randum, President Truman recognized that “communications 
intelligence (“COMINT”) activities of the U.S. are a national 
responsibility.”49  It further provides that the NSA’s mission 
“shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and con-
trol of the communications intelligence activities of the U.S. 
conducted against foreign governments, to provide for inte-
grated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto.”50  
Pursuant to the memorandum, the NSA, in performing its 
COMINT mission, “stands outside the framework of other gen-
eral intelligence activities.”51  It is this description of the NSA’s 
COMINT activities that helped create the perception that the 
NSA was once shielded from scrutiny and that enabled the NSA 
to claim that it had a unique mission.  Thus, historically the 
NSA maintained that “no existing statutes control, limit, or de-
fine the signals intelligence activities of NSA.”52  The NSA’s 
General Counsel also asserted that the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution did not apply to the NSA when 
  
 48. BAMFORD, supra note 42, at 1. See also LAWS AFFECTING THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL Section III-9 (1998).  
 49. BAMFORD, supra note 42, at 1. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Truman Memorandum, supra note 29.  The Truman Memorandum 
provides:   
The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be 
treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or 
general intelligence activities.  Orders, directives, policies, or recom-
mendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the 
collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utiliza-
tion of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable 
to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by 
competent departmental or agency authority represented on the 
Board.  Other National Security Council Intelligence Directive to the 
Director of Central Intelligence and related implementing directives 
issued by the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as 
non-applicable to COMINT activities, unless the National Security 
Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT. 
Id. 
52.  Church Report Book Three, supra note 1, at 736. 
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it intercepted international communications by American citi-
zens.53  
In 1976 Congress established a Committee to begin investi-
gating the NSA for possible abuse of authority.54  The Commit-
tee, led by Senator Frank Church, produced a final report that 
suggested that the NSA had violated the Constitutional rights 
of Americans.55  The Committee pointed to the use of watch lists 
and the interception of other communications as evidence of the 
NSA abusing its authority.56  It further uncovered that the NSA 
had intercepted millions of telegraphs and messages over the 
course of thirty years.57  Two surveillance programs which were 
cited by the Committee were Operation Shamrock and Opera-
tion Minaret.58  Operation Shamrock was described by the 
Church Committee report in the following manner: 
From August 1945 until May 1975, NSA received copies of mil-
lions of international telegrams sent to, from, or transiting the 
United States.  Codenamed Operation Shamrock, this was the 
largest governmental interception program affecting Ameri-
cans, dwarfing CIA’s mail opening program by comparison.  Of 
the messages provided to NSA by the three major interna-
tional telegraph companies, it is estimated that in later years 
approximately 150,000 per month were reviewed by NSA ana-
lysts.  NSA states that the original purpose of the program 
was to obtain the enciphered telegrams of certain foreign tar-
gets.  Nevertheless, NSA had access to virtually all the inter-
national telegrams of Americans carried by RCA Global and 
ITT World Communications (footnote omitted).  Once ob-
tained, these telegrams were available for analysis and dis-
semination according to NSA’s selection criteria, which in-
cluded the watch lists.59 
  
 53. Id. 
 54. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK TWO, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL 
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94–755 
(9th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1976), available at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib 
/church/contents.htm [hereinafter Church Report Book Two]. 
 55. David Ruppe, Big Brother is Listening, ABCNews.com, (Dec. 17, 2000), 
available at www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/spyII_990727.ht 
ml [hereinafter Ruppe]; Church Report Book Three, supra note 1, at 31. 
 56. Church Report Book Three, supra note 1, at 739. 
 57. Id. at 740.  
 58. Id. at 739–40.  
 59. Id. at 740. 
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Project Minaret was the codename given to the watch list pro-
gram.60  The Church Committee report described Project 
Minaret in the following manner: 
From the early 1960s until 1973, NSA intercepted and dis-
seminated international communications of selected American 
citizens and groups on the basis of lists of names supplied by 
other Government agencies.  In 1967, as part of a general con-
cern within the intelligence community over civil disturbances 
and peace demonstrations, NSA responded to Defense De-
partment requests by expanding its watch list program.  
Watch lists came to include the names of individuals, groups, 
and organizations involved in domestic antiwar and civil 
rights activities in an attempt to discover if there was “foreign 
influence” on them (footnote omitted).  
In 1969, NSA formalized the watch list program under the 
codename Minaret.  The program applied not only to alleged 
foreign influence on domestic dissent, but also to American 
groups and individuals whose activities “may result in civil 
disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the 
U.S.” (footnote omitted)  At the same time, NSA instructed its 
personnel to “restrict the knowledge” that NSA was collecting 
such information and to keep its name off the disseminated 
“product.”61 
 
These activities, among others, created concerns that the 
NSA was routinely invading the privacy of American citizens.62  
Privacy concerns resulted in new legislation affecting U.S. intel-
ligence agencies that constrained domestic surveillance activi-
ties.63 Executive Order 12,33364 and FISA65 were two such at-
tempts to reign in some of the NSA’s questionable tactics. 
  
 60. Id. at 739. 
 61. Id. at 739. In August 1973, NSA’s new director, General Lew Allen, Jr., 
suspended the dissemination of messages under the program pending recerti-
fication of agency requirements.   Id.  
 62. See Ruppe, supra note 55.   
 63. Id. Congressional Hearings in the 1970s “revealed the NSA had been 
engaging in serious abuses of U.S. citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. . . .  
Following the hearings, Congress in 1978 passed the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, restricting to a large extent the spy agency’s ability to collect 
information on Americans.”   Id.  
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C. Executive Order 12,333 
Executive Order 12,33366 was issued by President Reagan on 
December 4, 1981.67  The preamble for Executive Order 12,333 
provides that intelligence collection is essential to the national 
security of the U.S.68  Pursuant to the order, the NSA is author-
ized to collect, process and disseminate SIGINT information for 
national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes 
to support U.S. military operations.69  No other government 
agency is authorized to engage in signals intelligence activities 
unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense.70  The NSA, how-
ever, is only authorized to collect electronic communications for 
foreign intelligence purposes and may only disseminate this 
information to authorized government recipients.71  
Part 1 of Executive Order 12,333, titled Goals, Direction, Du-
ties, and Responsibilities with Respect to the National Intelli-
gence Effort,72 requires that the U.S. intelligence effort provide 
the President and the NSC information to protect the U.S. 
against national security threats and to conduct and develop 
foreign defense and economic policy.73  Part I only authorizes 
collection that is consistent with the law and mindful of the 
constitutional rights of United States persons.74   
Part 2, Conduct of Intelligence Activities, strives to achieve a 
“balance between the acquisition of essential information and 
protection of individual interests,”75 by providing that such col-
lection “will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsi-
ble manner that is consistent with the Constitution and appli-
  
 64. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 210, 212 (1982), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (2000).  
 65. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1862 
(1994). 
 66. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 210, 216 (1982), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (2000). 
 67. Id. at 200. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 208. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 201. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 208. 
 75. Id. at 210. 
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cable law and respectful of the principles upon which the U.S. 
was founded.”76 
Executive Order 12,333 is intended to “enhance human and 
technical collection techniques, especially those undertaken 
abroad…”77 in order to acquire foreign intelligence and to 
counter international terrorism and espionage conducted by 
foreign powers.78  Section 2.3, Collection of Information, specifi-
cally limits the ability to perform intelligence collection on 
United States persons.79  It specifies the types of information 
that could be the subject of collection efforts.  For example, in-
formation may be collected on a U.S. person only with the con-
sent of the person involved.80  Commercial information that con-
stitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence may be col-
lected.81  Collection efforts may also include information needed 
to protect the safety of people or organizations, sources or 
methods, and incidentally obtained information that indicates a 
violation of law.82   
Collection efforts by intelligence agencies are restricted by 
Section 2.4, Collection Techniques, which requires “use [of the] 
least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the U.S. or 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 210. 
 78. Id. Pursuant to Section 2.5, to carry out this mission, intelligence agen-
cies must be authorized by the Attorney General to conduct warrantless 
physical searches of property to obtain foreign intelligence and counterintelli-
gence information. Pursuant to Section 3.4(d), foreign intelligence is defined 
as:  “information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of for-
eign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence 
except for information on international terrorist activities.”  Section 3.4(a) 
defines counterintelligence as: “information gathered and activities conducted 
to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assas-
sinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or per-
sons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physi-
cal, document or communications security programs.”  Id. 
 79. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 211 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2000). Section 2.3 provides that: “Agencies within the Intelligence 
Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information con-
cerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established 
by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, 
consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order.”  Id.  
 80. Id. at 211. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 203, 211. 
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directed against United States persons abroad.”83  Section 2.4 
specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) to 
conduct electronic surveillance within the U.S., unconsented 
physical searches in the U.S. by agencies other than the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and physical surveillance of 
Americans in the U.S.84  These general proscriptions provide 
exceptions for limited purposes.85   
Section 2.5 requires the Attorney General’s approval before 
collection efforts can be directed “within the United States or 
against a United States person abroad, of any technique for 
which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law en-
forcement purposes.”86  In such a case, the Attorney General 
must determine in each case that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that the technique is directed against a foreign power or 
its agent.87  The NSA must convince the Attorney General that 
the person is an agent of a foreign power, a spy, a terrorist, a 
saboteur or someone who will provide assistance to such indi-
viduals or organizations.88 
  
 83. Id. at 212. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  The exception is that the CIA may not engage in domestic elec-
tronic surveillance generally, however, it may do so for the purposes of train-
ing, testing, or conducting countermeasures to foreign surveillance.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 214.  Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden described the NSA’s intelligence 
collection efforts as follows: 
NSA’s collection of foreign intelligence from foreign individuals and 
entities is designed to minimize the incidental, or unintentional, col-
lection of communications to, from, or about U.S. persons.  When 
NSA does acquire information about a U.S. person, NSA’s reporting 
does not disclose that person’s identity, and NSA will only do so upon 
a specific request that meets the standard derived from statute and 
imposed by Executive Order regulation…that is, the information is 
necessary to understand a particular piece of foreign intelligence or 
assess its importance. Similarly, no identities of U.S. persons may be 
disseminated (that is, transmitted to another Government depart-
ment or agency) by NSA unless doing so is necessary to understand a 
particular piece of foreign intelligence or assess its importance.  For 
example, if NSA intercepted a communication indicating that a ter-
rorist was about to harm a U.S. person, the name of the U.S. person 
would be retained and disseminated to appropriate law enforcement 
officials. 
Hayden Statement, supra note 39, at 6.  
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Another significant feature of Executive Order 12,333 is the 
legislative oversight it creates.89  Section 3.1, Congressional 
Oversight, requires the intelligence agencies to “cooperate with 
…Congress in the conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of 
intelligence activities.”90  Judicial oversight is also a part of Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333.91  Section 2.5 references FISA which re-
quires the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to issue court 
orders for electronic surveillance directed against foreign pow-
ers or their agents.92  
Executive Order 11,905,93 issued by President Ford in 1976, 
and Executive Order 12,036,94 issued by President Carter in 
1978, further limited intelligence gathering methods.95  Both 
prohibited the intelligence agencies from conducting war-
rantless domestic physical searches unless appropriate execu-
tive branch approval was obtained.96 
Thus, Executive Orders 12,333, 11,905 and 12,036 contained 
a common thread.  They were all intended to stop the earlier 
abuses by intelligence agencies.  To that end, these executive 
orders limited intelligence gathering methods, restricted collec-
tion efforts, required attorney general approval and provided for 
legislative oversight.  
D. Key Provisions of FISA 
FISA was passed by the 95th Congress in 1978 and signed 
into law by President Carter.97  FISA was the product of com-
promises between the executive and legislative branches in 
  
 89. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 214 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2000). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 212.  
 92. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–1805 
(1994).  
 93. See generally Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90, 99 (1976), reprinted 
in 50 U.S.C.§ 401 (Supp. I 1977). 
 94. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112, 126–28 (1979), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV 1980). 
 95. See generally Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90, 99 (1976), reprinted 
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. I 1977) and Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112, 
126–28 (1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV 1980). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
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their effort to address abuses in the intelligence agencies re-
vealed by the Church Committee Investigation.98  FISA was also 
an attempt to balance the claimed inherent national security 
authority of the executive branch with the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.99  The NSA’s 
administrative and legal process for conducting electronic sur-
veillance is largely governed by Executive Order 12,333100 and 
FISA.   
FISA is a complex statute that has been criticized for lacking 
“due process and accountability.”101  FISA provides the proce-
dures for obtaining electronic surveillance authorization with-
out a court order.102  Section 1802 authorizes the President, 
through the Attorney General, to permit electronic surveillance 
to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period of up to 
one year without a court order.103  The Attorney General must 
certify that (1) the electronic surveillance is “solely directed” at 
communications “between or among foreign powers;”104 (2) there 
is no “substantial likelihood” that the surveillance will involve a 
U.S. person;105 and, (3) that minimization procedures are in ef-
fect.106  Fourth Amendment challenges to this provision have 
  
 98. See generally Church Report Book Three, supra note 1, at 31.  
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  This amendment provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be  searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id.  See also In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing, S. REP. NO. 
604 and holding that the purpose of FISA was to strike a balance between the 
need for surveillance and the protection of civil liberties). 
 100. See supra Part II.C. 
 101. Gerald H. Robinson, We’re Listening! Electronic Eavesdropping, FISA, 
and the Secret Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 51, 72 (2000) [hereinafter Robin-
son]. 
 102. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994). 
 103. Id. § 1802(a)(1). 
 104. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 105. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B). 
 106. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(C).  Under Section 1801(h)  
(b) “Minimization procedures” with respect to electronic surveillance, 
means  
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been unsuccessful.107  In United States v. Pelton,108 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that FISA 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the statutory 
safeguards provided “sufficient protection” of individual rights 
when balanced against the government’s interest in gathering 
foreign intelligence which is of “paramount importance to na-
tional security.”109 
  
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney 
General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and 
technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisi-
tion and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly 
available information concerning unconsenting United States 
persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;  
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available informa-
tion, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in 
subsection (e)(1) of this section, shall not be disseminated in a 
manner that identifies any United States person, without such 
person’s consent, unless such person’s identity is necessary to 
understand foreign intelligence information or assess its impor-
tance;  
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that al-
low for the retention and dissemination of information that is 
evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law en-
forcement purposes; and  
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to 
any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802(a) 
of this title, procedures that require that no contents of any 
communication to which a United States person is a party shall 
be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained 
for longer than twenty-four hours unless a court order under sec-
tion 1805 of this title is obtained or unless the Attorney General 
determines that the information indicates a threat of death or se-
rious bodily harm to any person.  
Id. 
 107. Robinson, supra note 101, at 67. 
 108. United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 
U.S. 1010 (1988). 
 109. Id. at 1074–75.  See also United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 
1192 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that electronic surveillance of home phone 
number does not violate Fifth Amendment rights provided object of surveil-
lance is foreign intelligence, even if criminal prosecution may follow).  See 
United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that FISA 
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FISA also created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(“FISA Court”),110 frequently referred to as the “secret court” 
because it conducts proceedings under specified security rules 
in a secure room in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).111  The 
FISA Court is comprised of seven district court judges desig-
nated by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court.112  The FISA Court’s jurisdiction includes hearing appli-
cations for and issuing orders approving or denying electronic 
surveillance within the U.S.113  Section 1803 also establishes a 
Court of Review (“FISA Review Court”) consisting of three dis-
trict court or appellate court judges also designated by the Chief 
Justice.114  The FISA Review Court has jurisdiction to review the 
denial of surveillance applications.115  FISA Court proceedings 
are required to be conducted expeditiously and the record of the 
proceedings “shall be maintained under security measures es-
tablished by the Chief Justice[,] in consultation with the Attor-
ney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence.”116 
Requirements for applications for electronic surveillance or-
ders are detailed in Section 1804.117  These requirements in-
clude, inter alia, disclosure of the identity of the federal officer 
submitting the request and a “statement of the facts and cir-
cumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that 
— the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power.”118  This section also requires the 
federal officer to provide a description of the information 
sought, a statement of the proposed minimization procedures, a 
  
evidence may be used in subsequent criminal prosecution but “investigation of 
the criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of the surveillance”).  
 110. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1994). 
 111. See Robinson, supra note 101, at 51.  
 112. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1994). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 1803(b). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. § 1803(c). 
 117. Id. § 1804.  
 118. Id. § 1804(a)(1)-(4).  See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 
(4th Cir. 2000), (citing United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 
1987) (requiring a statement of reasons to believe that the target of the sur-
veillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and certification by an 
executive branch official that the information sought is foreign intelligence 
information and cannot be obtained by other means).  Id. 
File: DavisMacro2.doc Created on: 10/18/2003 6:58 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:34 PM 
2003] CIVIL LIBERTIES 193 
statement of facts concerning previous applications made in-
volving the same people, facilities or places, and a statement of 
the time period for which the electronic surveillance will be 
maintained.119  
Particular findings are required before the FISA Court can 
issue a surveillance order.120  Necessary findings include facts 
submitted by the applicant that there is probable cause to be-
lieve the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.121  
In addition, minimization procedures must meet the require-
ments of the definition found in Section 1804(h).122  In determin-
ing whether probable cause exists to issue a surveillance order, 
judges may also consider past, current and future activities of 
the target.123  Section 1805 requires that an order approving 
electronic surveillance identify the target, describe the location 
of each facility, describe the type of information sought, indicate 
whether physical entry will be used, and the period of time of 
the electronic surveillance.124  It also requires that minimization 
procedures be followed and the applicant compensate the car-
rier, landlord, or other person furnishing aid to the surveillance 
effort.125  The duration of a surveillance order is for a period 
“necessary to achieve its purpose, or ninety days, whichever is 
less.”126  However, electronic surveillance against a foreign 
power target may be for up to one year.127  An order may be ex-
tended on the same basis as the original order upon a new ap-
plication and new findings.128   
In U.S. v. Squillacote,129 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that where the target of electronic 
  
 119. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1804(a)(5), (6), (9), 
(10) (1994). 
 120. Id. § 1805(b).  
 121. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). (“No United States person may be considered an 
agent of a foreign power solely based on the exercise of activities protected 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution….”). 
 122. Id. § 1805(a)(4). 
 123. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(b) (West 
2003) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (1994). 
 124. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b)(1) (1994). 
 125. Id § 1805(b)(2)(A),(D). 
 126. Id. § 1805(d)(1). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 1805(d)(2). 
 129. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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surveillance is a “United States person”130 as defined by FISA, 
surveillance may be authorized “only if the FISA judge con-
cludes that there is ‘probable cause to believe that the target of 
the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, 
that proposed minimization procedures are sufficient, [and] that 
the certifications required have been made…’”131  However, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has 
held that nonresident aliens who are in the U.S. on visitor or 
student visas do not qualify as “United States persons” under 
FISA.132   
FISA restricts the use of information acquired from electronic 
surveillance concerning any United States person.133  Acquired 
information may only be used and disclosed by federal employ-
ees without the consent of the United States person when 
minimization procedures are adhered to.134  No privileged infor-
mation acquired will lose its privileged status.135  Additionally, 
federal officers may use acquired information only for lawful 
purposes.136  If the government intends to use information ac-
quired by electronic surveillance in any proceeding, it must so 
notify the affected person and the court prior to trial or hearing 
that it intends to disclose such information.137  “Any person 
against whom evidence is obtained or derived from an electronic 
surveillance…may move to suppress the evidence obtained or 
derived…on the grounds that…it was unlawfully acquired; or 
  
 130. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (1994) de-
fines “United States person” as:  
a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of the Title 8(1), an 
unincorporated association a substantial number of members of 
which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the 
United States, but does not include a corporation or an association 
which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of 
this section. 
Id.  
 131. Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 553. 
 132. ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 464 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 133. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (1994). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. § 1806(c). 
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the surveillance was not made in conformity with an order of 
authorization or approval.”138  The district court, upon notice by 
the government or an aggrieved individual, will conduct an in 
camera and ex parte review of the application, and order any 
other material relating to the surveillance to determine 
whether the surveillance was lawfully authorized and con-
ducted.139  If the surveillance was not lawfully authorized and 
conducted the district court must suppress the evidence ob-
tained.140  “If the Court determines that the surveillance was 
lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion” to 
suppress unless due process requires discovery and disclosure.141  
In U.S. v. Hamide, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that in camera and ex parte review under 
FISA was adequate to ensure that a factual record was suffi-
ciently developed to allow eventual appellate review.142 
Finally, FISA requires the Attorney General to file a report to 
the Administrative Office of the United States Court and Con-
gress regarding the number of applications for electronic sur-
veillance orders and extensions approved, modified or denied.143  
The Attorney General is also required to “fully inform” the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on a semiannual basis, 
concerning all electronic surveillance.144  FISA imposes criminal 
sanctions for intentional violations of electronic surveillance 
procedures145 and creates a cause of action for damages for cer-
tain individuals146 who have been subjected to electronic surveil-
lance or about whom such information has been disclosed.147 
  
 138. Id. § 1806(e). 
 139. Id. § 1806(f). 
 140. Id. § 1806(g). 
 141. Id. 
 142. United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 143. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C §1807 (1994). 
 144. Id. § 1808. 
 145. Id. § 1809.  This section makes intentional violation a crime punishable 
by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five 
years, or both.  Id. 
 146. Excluding foreign powers or agents of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 
(1994). 
 147. Id. § 1810.  This section creates a cause of action against any person 
who committed the violation for actual damages, punitive damages, reason-
able attorney’s fees and other costs reasonably incurred. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION ON 4TH   
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Before a search warrant can be issued, the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution requires that law enforcement have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the law is being violated.148  
This requirement helps to limit the focus and targets of crimi-
nal investigations, control overzealous law enforcement officers 
and protect innocent civilians.149  FISA does not contain this 
criminal standard of probable cause.150  Instead, FISA contains a 
“foreign intelligence standard” of probable cause which requires 
a showing that the target may be an agent of a foreign govern-
ment and the place or facility to be searched is being used in 
furtherance of espionage or terrorist activities.151  Thus, the 
criminal standard that requires probable cause for a search 
warrant and the foreign intelligence standard are very differ-
ent, in that they require different showings.  
A. FISA Jurisprudence 
The tension that exists between the need of the executive 
branch to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance for national 
security reasons and the right of citizens to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures is due to the difference between 
executive authority under Article II of the United States Con-
stitution and individual rights under the Fourth Amendment.152  
Electronic surveillance in particular has not been easily catego-
rized in constitutional jurisprudence.153  As early as Olmstead v. 
United States,154 a sharply divided Supreme Court had trouble 
viewing telephone conversations obtained through wiretaps as 
the equivalent of tangible items subject to seizure.155  Thus, the 
  
 148. See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). 
 149. See Bringer v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
 150. The Electronic Privacy Information Center, Overview of FISA, at http:// 
www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
 151. Id. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. II; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 153. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458–66 (1928) (reviewing 
the “chief cases” where the Supreme Court has confronted and addressed 
similar Fourth Amendment claims as well as common law rules).  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 466.   
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telephone conversation in Olmstead was admissible in a crimi-
nal trial and not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s unreason-
able search and seizure prohibition.156  This decision served to 
encourage the executive branch’s use of electronic surveil-
lance.157  The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”)158 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Nardone v. United States,159 
interpreting the FCA, sought to restrain the use of electronic 
surveillance.160  World War II, however, elevated the importance 
of electronic surveillance and the executive branch’s use of elec-
tronic surveillance did not wane with the end of the war.161 
The Supreme Court overruled Olmstead, in Katz v. United 
States,162 and introduced the concept of individual privacy ex-
pectations.163  In Katz, the court discussed the importance of 
surveillance activities linked to national security interests, and 
thus set the stage for FISA.164  After the Katz decision, Congress 
passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.165  This Act established procedures for obtaining a warrant 
and expressly indicated that it was not intended to interfere 
with the executive authority of the President.166  By now, the 
  
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions 
brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been 
violated as against a defendant, unless there has been an  official 
search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his 
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house 
'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure.  We think, there-
fore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search 
or  seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (And Wires) Have Ears: The 
Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 796 (1989) [hereinafter Cinquegrana]. 
 158. The Federal Communication Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151–613 (West 
2003).  
 159. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 160. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 797. 
 161. Id. at 798. 
 162. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 163. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 800. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90– 
351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522 (West 2003)). 
 166. See comments to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (West 2003).  Under Part 2, enti-
tled “Construction”: “In enacting this Chapter, Congress refrained from at-
 
File: DavisMacro2.doc Created on:  10/18/2003 6:58 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:34 PM 
198 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
President claimed inherent powers under Article II to conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance for national security pur-
poses.167  The United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan,168 on facts not involving foreign intelligence surveillance, 
however, held that the Fourth Amendment required prior judi-
cial approval for domestic electronic surveillance.169  Thus, the 
scope of the executive branch’s power to conduct warrantless 
electronic surveillance when acting in the interests of national 
security remained very much undecided.170  The lower courts 
struggled with the issue of the legality of warrantless electronic 
surveillance for national security purposes.171  Later Congress, 
in light of the issues raised by the Church Committee, was more 
receptive to “the need to regulate electronic surveillance for na-
tional security purposes.”172 
In United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, the Supreme Court challenged Congress to develop 
  
tempting to convey to the President any power which he did not already pos-
sess, and in providing that nothing therein contained should be deemed to 
limit constitutional powers of the President, Congress did not use language 
appropriate for grant of power.”  Id. 
 167. United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 320 (finding a case has not “been made for the requested depar-
ture from Fourth Amendment standards”).  Id. 
 170. Id. at 321–22. (noting the narrow scope of its decision and states “[w]e 
have not addressed, and express no opinion as to the issues which may be 
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents”).  Id.  
 171. At the time, five federal courts considered the issue of warrantless 
electronic surveillance.  Of the five, four United States Courts of Appeals were 
willing to recognize a foreign intelligence exception.  See United States v. 
Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); 
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606 (3d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 
U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977), cert 
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); and United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 913 
(4th Cir. 1980).  In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the only court to 
“cast fundamental doubt” on the constitutional basis for warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance.  However, this case did not involve a foreign power or 
agent of a foreign power.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals expressed its 
belief that all warrantless electronic surveillance would be unreasonable 
unless exigencies could justify the constitutional invasion.  Id.  
 172. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 807. 
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national security standards for electronic surveillance that dif-
fered from the law enforcement standards in the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.173  Congress and the 
courts were uncertain regarding the scope of executive branch 
authority in the area of national security and foreign surveil-
lance.174  Executive branch practice coupled with ambiguity re-
garding an appropriate judicial role, if any, in restricting elec-
tronic surveillance, required Congress to address issues of sepa-
ration of powers.175  The Church Committee’s investigation re-
vealed abuses by the intelligence agencies in violation of indi-
vidual privacy interests.176  These abuses of executive discretion 
were attributable to unsettled case law and lack of congres-
sional or judicial standards.177  As a result of its investigation, 
the Church Committee recommended that Congress develop 
legislation to restrict electronic surveillance for intelligence 
purposes.178  The Committee suggested that electronic surveil-
lance within the U.S. be restricted to the FBI, pursuant to a 
judicial warrant.179 
Congress questioned whether it was appropriate to involve 
Article III judges in the approval process for electronic surveil-
lance for national security purposes.180  The Congressional Re-
search Service181 addressed this concern in a memorandum that 
concluded that surveillance approval is a case or controversy as 
that term is used in Article III, and judicial supervision was 
appropriate in this area because of the government and privacy 
interests at stake.182   
  
 173. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 
U.S. at 322–23. 
 174. Id. at 322.  
 175. Id. at 322–24.  
 176. Church Report Book Three, supra note 1, at 735. 
 177. See Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 807; Church Report Book Two, 
supra note 54, at 186–87. 
 178. See generally Church Report Book Two, supra note 54.  
 179. Church Report Book Two at 297, 299; see also Cinquegrana, supra note 
157, at 807. 
 180. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 808 n. 81. 
 181. The Congressional Research Service serves Congress throughout the 
legislative process by providing comprehensive and reliable legislative re-
search and analysis.   
 182. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 808. 
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The constitutional issues that were debated before FISA was 
enacted continue to be the subject of debate.183  Does Congress 
have the authority to limit the executive authority in the area 
of electronic surveillance for foreign/domestic intelligence collec-
tion?  Is warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelli-
gence collection compatible with the Fourth Amendment?  Does 
Article III permit the FISA Court to conduct a hearing in cam-
era and ex parte?184  In United States v. Duggan,185 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had occasion to 
examine these constitutional issues and concluded that the pro-
cedures in FISA adequately balanced the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights with the need to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.186  
Before FISA was enacted, courts that addressed the issue of 
the warrant requirement in the context of national security 
surveillance concluded that the President had inherent power 
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to collect foreign 
intelligence information.187  The prevailing view was that elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes constituted 
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
  
 183. Id. at 816.  
 184. These constitutional questions are now magnified in light of the events 
that took place on the morning of September 11, 2001 in New York City and 
Washington, D.C.  In one of the worst terrorist attacks in the history of the 
civilized world, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York were 
leveled as hijacked commercial airliners were flown into the towers and ex-
ploded.  The Pentagon also came under attack when another hijacked com-
mercial airliner plowed into it approximately one hour later.  See Serge 
Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for ‘Evil’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.  
 185. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 186. Id. at 73.  The defendants in Duggan were agents of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army who sought to acquire explosives, weapons, ammuni-
tion, and remote-controlled detonation devices from the United States to be 
exported to Northern Ireland for use in terrorist activities. The defendants 
moved to suppress evidence from FISA surveillance. They argued, inter alia, 
that FISA surveillance was so broad that it violated due process, separation of 
powers, and equal protection to aliens.  Id. 
 187. Id. at 72.  See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. 
Supp. 66 (D.N.J. 1970), rev’d en banc, 494 F.2d 593, 604–06 (3rd Cir. 1974), 
and cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). 
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ment.188  While the Supreme Court declined to address this issue 
in United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, it made clear that Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirements may change when different governmen-
tal interests, like national security, are at stake.189   
FISA was again challenged in the 1985 case of In re Kevork.190  
In Kevork, the Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada “issued an 
order for a commission to take evidence of eight witnesses in 
Los Angeles, California.”191  These witnesses had overheard con-
versations of the defendants pursuant to orders issued by the 
FISA Court.192  The purpose of the commission was to gather 
evidence in a pending criminal prosecution in Canada.193  A 
  
 188. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72.  See United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). 
 189. See United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972). The Supreme Court held:  
[W]e do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures pre-
scribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.  We recog-
nize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy 
and practical considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary 
crime.”  The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and 
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.  
The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to iden-
tify than in surveillance operations against many types of crime 
specified in Title III.  Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli-
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the en-
hancement of the Government’s preparedness for some possible fu-
ture crisis or emergency.  Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance 
may be less precise than that directed against more conventional 
types of crime. 
Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveil-
lances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish 
to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those 
already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.  Different stan-
dards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government for 
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.  The 
warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest 
to be pursued and the nature of citizen’s rights requiring protection. 
Id. at 322–23. 
 190. In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1985).  
 191. Id. at 1004. 
 192. Id. at 1005. 
 193. Id.  
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United States District Court judge and a justice from the Su-
preme Court of Ontario were appointed as commissioners to 
obtain the evidence requested.194  The information sought in-
volved private communications between some of the defendants 
regarding a conspiracy to murder a Turkish diplomat which the 
FBI intercepted.195  The conversations were overheard through 
microphones and a telephone tap installed in the home of a non-
party.196  The defendants moved to block the Commission from 
receiving the testimony and evidence by attacking the constitu-
tionality of FISA.197  Because the defendants’ motion to suppress 
evidence involved the bona fides of the Commission receiving 
evidence obtained through an order issued under FISA, a 
United States District Court judge considered the defendants’ 
motion.198   
The defendants argued that FISA was unconstitutional and 
violated the Fourth Amendment because its orders were not 
search warrants and did not meet probable cause require-
ments.199  They also argued that FISA was vague because it 
“contains no real limits regarding who or what may be a proper 
surveillance target.”200  The defendants also contended that 
FISA violated Article III of the Constitution because the FISA 
Court was not a proper Article III court.201  Finally they argued 
that it improperly delegated judicial power to the executive 
branch.202   
The court held that FISA did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment because the Fourth Amendment is flexible and different 
standards may be applied to meet other governmental interests 
such as foreign intelligence collection.203  The court also con-
cluded that the defendants’ argument that FISA was vague was 
without merit, holding that FISA set out reasonable standards 
which must be met before anyone can become the target of for-
  
 194. Id. at 1004. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 1005. 
 197. Id. at 1010. 
 198. See id. at 1005. 
 199. Id. at 1010. 
 200. Id. at 1012. 
 201. Id. at 1014. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. at 1010–11. 
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eign intelligence surveillance.204  Regarding the defendants’ con-
tention that FISA violated Article III, the court concluded that 
there was substantial precedent for specialized courts such as 
the FISA Court.205   
At the time FISA was debated and passed, Congress was 
aware of the abuses of domestic national security surveillance 
and of the legal uncertainty of whether the executive branch 
had inherent authority to execute warrantless electronic sur-
veillance for foreign intelligence collection.206  Thus, FISA was 
passed in order “to settle the unresolved question of the appli-
cability of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, and to ‘re-
move any doubt as to the lawfulness of such surveillance.’”207  
The court concluded that FISA contained well-defined proce-
dures that permitted a FISA Court judge to authorize electronic 
  
 204. See id. at 1010–12.  The court continued: “As the legislative history 
makes clear, FISA was enacted to ‘reconcile national intelligence and counter-
intelligence needs with constitutional principles in a way that is consistent 
with both national security and individual rights.’”  Id. 
 205. Id. at 1014.  
 206. Id. at 1011.  The court noted that when electronic surveillance is used 
for intelligence purposes rather than for detecting crimes, different protec-
tions may be applied and still be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Court stressed that Congress was aware of this aspect citing United States v. 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan when it 
passed FISA.  Id.  See also SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. NO. 
95–701, (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973. The Report provided:   
The departures here from conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine 
have, therefore, been given close scrutiny to ensure that the proce-
dures established in FISA are reasonable in relation to legitimate 
foreign counterintelligence requirements and the protected rights of 
individuals.  Their reasonableness depends, in part, upon an assess-
ment of the difficulties of investigating activities planned, directed, 
and supported from abroad by foreign intelligence services and for-
eign-based terrorist groups.  The differences between ordinary crimi-
nal investigations to gather evidence of  specific crimes and foreign 
counterintelligence investigations to uncover and monitor clandestine 
activities have been taken into account.  Other factors include the in-
ternational responsibilities of the United States, the duties of the 
Federal Government to the States in matters involving foreign terror-
ism, and the need to maintain the secrecy of lawful counterintelli-
gence sources and methods.  
Id. at 3983.  
 207. In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 95–1283, Pt. I (95th Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1978)). 
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surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without violating 
the privacy rights of United States citizens.208  FISA represents 
a Congressional effort to provide a constitutional structure to 
foreign intelligence collection that is consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.209  Though the United States Supreme Court has 
declined to rule on the constitutionality of FISA, the Act has 
withstood substantial judicial scrutiny.210  
B. The 1994 Amendments to FISA and their Application to 
Physical Searches 
While FISA was enacted to provide a clear means of authoriz-
ing electronic surveillance activities for national security pur-
poses it was unclear whether or not FISA also applied to physi-
cal searches.211  At the time of its passage in 1978, FISA only 
addressed procedures applicable to electronic searches not 
physical searches.212  It would take almost twenty-years before 
Congress amended FISA and clarified the procedures applicable 
for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.213  
Shortly after the 1994 amendments were passed, President 
Clinton signed Executive Order 12,949,214 which recognized that 
FISA, as amended, now clearly applied to physical searches.215  
Thus, the debate that had occurred regarding whether FISA 
was intended to apply to electronic surveillance and physical 
searches ended with the passage of the 1994 FISA amendments 
and Executive Order 12,949.216  
The conduct of physical searches under FISA is governed by 
Sections 1821-1829.217  These provisions mirror those applicable 
to electronic surveillance.218  Physical search is defined by stat-
ute to mean: 
  
 208. Id. at 1010. 
 209. See id. at 1014. 
 210. Cinquegrana, supra note 157, at 820. 
 211. Id. at 821–22. 
 212. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1994). 
 213. Id. §§ 1821–1829. 
 214. Exec. Order No. 12,949, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 
1822 (1994). See also U.S. v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
 215. Exec. Order No. 12,949, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1996), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 
1822 (1994). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829 (1994). 
 218. Id. §§ 1801–1811. 
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any physical intrusion within the United States into premises 
or property…in which a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement 
purposes…but does not include (A) “electronic surveillance”… 
or the (B) acquisition by the United States Government of for-
eign intelligence information from…means other than elec-
tronic surveillance…219   
FISA authorizes the President through the Attorney General 
to approve physical searches without a court order to acquire 
foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year.220  
The Attorney General must certify that the physical search is 
directed at property under the control of a foreign power, that 
there is no substantial likelihood that the search will involve 
the premises of a United States person, and that minimization 
procedures are in place.221  Compensation must be paid for the 
use of any facilities or assistance necessary to accomplish the 
physical search.222   
The FISA Court has jurisdiction to expeditiously hear appli-
cations for and grant orders approving physical searches for the 
purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information.223  The 
FISA Review Court, established under Section 1803, has juris-
diction to review the denial of any application for physical 
searches made under FISA.224  An application for a physical 
search order must, inter alia, (1) be made by a federal officer; 
(2) describe the target of the search in detail and; (3) identify 
the property targeted as containing foreign intelligence infor-
mation that is owned or controlled by a foreign power or 
agent.225  If a FISA Court judge decides to issue an order for a 
physical search, the order must contain findings that there ex-
ists probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power 
or agent, that the premises is owned, used or possessed by a 
foreign power and that minimization procedures are in place.226  
In determining probable cause, a FISA Court judge may con-
  
 219. Id. § 1821(5). 
 220. Id. § 1822(a)(1). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. § 1822(a)(4)(A)–(B). 
 223. Id. § 1822(c), (e). 
 224. Id. § 1822(d). 
 225. Id. § 1823(a)(1), (2), (3). 
 226. Id. § 1824(a). 
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sider past, current and future activities of the target.227  Physi-
cal search orders approved under Section 1824 are for the time 
period necessary to achieve its purpose or for forty-five days, 
whichever is less, and the orders may be extended for up to one 
year.228  Emergency orders are authorized under Section 
1824(d).229  Information obtained from a physical search con-
cerning a United States person may be disclosed and used by 
federal officers without the consent of the United States person 
only in accordance with required minimization procedures.230  
If the federal government intends to use information obtained 
from the physical search in any proceeding, the government 
must notify the target of the search.231  The target may then 
submit a motion to suppress on the grounds that the informa-
tion was unlawfully acquired or the search was not in compli-
ance with the order.232  The District Court hearing the matter 
must conduct an in camera and ex parte review if the Attorney 
General argues that disclosure would harm the national secu-
rity of the U.S.233  Congressional oversight and criminal and civil 
sanctions are also applicable to the physical search provisions.234  
FISA authorizes the use of pen registers and trap and trace de-
vices for foreign intelligence collection and international terror-
ism investigations.235  FISA also authorizes the FBI to have ac-
cess to business records related to an investigation and to 
gather information on foreign intelligence or on international 
terrorism.236 
  
 227. Id. § 1824(b).  
 228. Id. § 1824(c). 
 229. Id. § 1824(d). 
 230. Id. § 1825(a). 
 231. Id. § 1825(d), (f). 
 232. Id. § 1825(d), (f). 
 233. Id. § 1825(g). 
 234. Id. §§ 1826–1828. 
 235. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 2003) 
(amending scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (1994)).  Pen registers are devices 
which record or decode electronic impulses which identify numbers transmit-
ted on the telephone line.  Trap and trace devices capture incoming impulses 
and identify the originating number.  Id. 
 236. See id. § 1862. 
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The application of FISA to physical searches has been a sub-
ject of debate for over ten years.237  The first constitutional chal-
lenge to the physical search provisions of FISA was in United 
States v. Nicholson.238  In a wide-ranging but very brief opinion 
dismissing defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the court 
applied pre-1994 FISA law to FISA as amended, in the context 
of the new physical search authority.239   
The defendant, Harold Nicholson, was charged with at-
tempted espionage, espionage, and conspiracy to commit espio-
nage in violation of the Espionage Act.240  During the investiga-
tion that led to the defendant’s arrest, his “home, office, car, 
safe deposit box, and personal effects were subject to electronic 
surveillance and physical searches conducted under FISA.”241  
The defendant sought the suppression of the evidence obtained 
from the electronic surveillance and physical searches contend-
ing, inter alia, that FISA procedures violate due process, equal 
protection, separation of powers, the political question doctrine, 
and the Fourth Amendment.242   
The issue in United States v. Nicholson was whether the 1994 
FISA amendments permitting physical searches for foreign in-
telligence collection were constitutional.243  The defendant ar-
gued that physical searches were more intrusive than electronic 
searches and must be reviewed under a more stringent consti-
tutional standard than that applied to electronic surveillance.244  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia held, that consistent with prior precedent, “...Fourth 
  
 237. See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physi-
cal Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the 
Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 155–56 (1985) [hereinafter Brown 
& Cinquegrana]. 
 238. United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588 (E.D.Va. 1997). 
 239. See generally id.  
 240. Id. at 590. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 591 n.6. 
 243. The court in setting up the question to be addressed noted that al-
though he was bound by United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074–75 (4th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988) (holding that the provisions of 
FISA are a reasonable accommodation between the governments need for 
intelligence information and the citizens right to privacy),“this Court ad-
dresses the narrow issue of physical searches under FISA as a matter of first 
impression.”  Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 590–91. 
 244. Id. at 591 n.6. 
File: DavisMacro2.doc Created on:  10/18/2003 6:58 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:34 PM 
208 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
Amendment jurisprudence regards physical entry and elec-
tronic surveillance on an even plane, with each subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”245  The 
court concluded that the physical searches in Nicholson were 
constitutionally indistinguishable from authorized electronic 
surveillance which had been unanimously upheld by all federal 
courts deciding the issue.246   
The defendant also argued that the ex parte and in camera 
review authorized by FISA violated the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment247 and the right to counsel clause of the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.248  The court, based on 
prior case law found that FISA did not violate the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendments by authorizing ex parte and in camera review.249  
The court was not persuaded by the defendant’s Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection clause argument that FISA is based on 
  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. 
 247. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Amendment V of the United States Constitu-
tion provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a  presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Id. 
 248. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 590.  Amendment VI of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the  accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witne- 
sses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense. 
U.S. CONST. amend.VI. 
 249. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 592 (citing United States v. Belfield, 692 
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) rejecting the argument that FISA violated the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments). 
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invidious distinctions between agents of foreign powers as op-
posed to agents of domestic powers.250   
In addition, the court held that FISA surveillance sanctioned 
by Article III judges did not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.251  The defendant argued that asking Article III judges 
to adjudicate search requests violated the separation of powers 
doctrine by allowing the judicial branch to interfere with execu-
tive branch authority.252  The court followed an unbroken line of 
case law that consistently held that an Article III judge is prop-
erly acting in his judicial capacity when sitting on the FISA 
Court.253  The defendant also argued that the surveillance and 
search violated the political question doctrine and had an im-
permissible chilling effect on First Amendment free speech.254  
The district court found these claims without merit citing 
United States v. Duggan255 and ACLU v. Barr.256  Regarding the 
defendant’s First Amendment concern, the court noted that 
FISA explicitly provides that the exercise of free speech cannot 
be the sole basis for considering a United States person a for-
eign power or agent of a foreign power.257  Thus, in the first case 
to test the constitutionality of the 1994 FISA amendments re-
garding physical searches, the district court applied pre-
amendment FISA federal law to uphold the constitutional valid-
ity of the physical search provisions.  There are several implica-
  
 250. Id. at 592. The court held:  
[T]his Court holds that FISA does not violate any fundamental con-
stitutionally-protected rights of  surveillance subjects. Accordingly, th-
is Court subjects FISA to rationality review and again adopts the rea-
soning of the Second Circuit in Duggan, holding that disparate 
treatment of foreign and domestic groups is rationally related to the 
“Act’s purposes of attempting to protect the United States against 
various types of acts of foreign powers and to acquire information 
necessary to the national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”  
Accordingly, FISA does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. 
 251. Id. at 592–93.  
 252. Id. at 592.  
 253. Id. at 593. 
 254. Id.  
 255. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984).  
 256. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 593.  See American Civil Liberties Union v. 
Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 464 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 257. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 593.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (1994). 
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tions to this holding.  First, the court signaled that it would not 
draw a Fourth Amendment intrusiveness distinction between 
physical searc- hes and electronic surveillance.  The court was 
not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that physical 
searches of a residence are more intrusive than electronic sur-
veillance.  Second, this was the first court to hold that the FISA 
physical search provisions satisfy the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Third, and most significantly, the court 
found physical searches and electronic searches to be “on an 
even plane” and to be subject to the same reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.  Fourth, the court fol-
lowed prior precedent involving electronic surveillance and ap-
plied that precedent to physical searches in holding the physical 
search provisions of FISA were a reasonable accommodation 
between the government’s need for intelligence information and 
the citizen’s right to privacy.  
Therefore, in a very significant decision involving the appli-
cability of the Fourth Amendment to physical searches under 
FISA, the court denied Nicholson’s motion to suppress evi-
dence.258  While the legislative history of FISA demonstrates a 
clear congressional intent to restrain intelligence collection ac-
tivities that were too intrusive, the court held that the physical 
search provisions under the Act were not intrusive and struck 
the appropriate balance between the government’s interest in 
acquiring intelligence and protecting the rights of citizens.259 
More recently, in United States v. Usama Bin-Laden,260 the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that there is an exception to the warrant requirement 
for searches conducted abroad for foreign intelligence collection 
targeting foreign powers or their agents.261  The district court 
also concluded that this exception applied to the physical search 
of an American citizen’s home in a foreign country when there 
was probable cause to believe that the citizen was an agent of a 
foreign power and the purpose of the physical search was un-
  
 258. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. at 593. 
 259. Id. at 590 (quoting United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 
1987)). 
 260. United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 261. Id. at 277. 
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dertaken primarily for the purpose of foreign intelligence collec-
tion.262   
The defendants in Bin-Laden were charged with offenses 
arising out of their participation in the international terrorist 
organization known as Al Qaeda.263  These charges arose out of 
the defendant’s involvement in the August 1998 bombings of 
the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tan-
zania.264  El Hage, an American citizen and one of the defen-
dants, sought the suppression of evidence seized from the 
physical search and electronic surveillance.265   
The U.S. intelligence community identified several telephone 
numbers which were being used by people associated with Al 
Qaeda.266  Several telephone numbers led directly to El-Hage.267  
Based on this information, the Attorney General authorized the 
collection of intelligence specifically targeting El-Hage.268  In 
August of 1997, American and Kenyan officials conducted a 
search of the defendant’s residence in Kenya and seized many 
items.269  Defendant El-Hage and others sought suppression of 
the evidence which was seized during the warrantless search of 
his home in Kenya.270  He also sought suppression of evidence 
derived from the electronic surveillance of several telephone 
lines, including his cellular phone.271  In response to defendant’s 
motion to suppress, the government argued that the searches 
were primarily for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection 
and not subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.272  
Thus, the Bin-Laden case raised significant issues of first im-
pression.273  Among these was the applicability of the Fourth A- 
mendment to searches conducted abroad for foreign intelligence 
purposes targeting United States persons believed to be agents 
  
 262. Id. at 285. 
 263. Id. at 268. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 269. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 270. 
 273. Id. 
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of a foreign power.274  The court analyzed the cases finding an 
exception to the warrant requirement for foreign intelligence 
collection and concluded that the basis for the exception rested 
in the constitutional grant to the executive branch of power over 
foreign affairs.275  The court also noted that “[w]arrantless for-
eign intelligence collection has been an established practice of 
the executive branch for decades.”276  Citing United States v. Bu-
tenko,277 the court observed that in some circumstances the im-
position of a warrant requirement may be a disabling burden on 
the executive branch.278  Thus, in finding an exception to the 
warrant requirement to conduct physical searches of American 
citizens abroad who are targets of foreign intelligence collection, 
the court, quoting United States v. Truong279 reasoned that “[a] 
warrant requirement would add a procedural hurdle that would 
reduce the flexibility of executive foreign intelligence initiatives 
[and] in some cases delay executive response to foreign intelli-
gence threats.”280 
In recognizing the legitimacy of a warrant exception the court 
concluded that the power of the executive branch to conduct 
foreign intelligence collection would be significantly frustrated 
  
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 272. 
 276. Id. at 273. United States v. United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (citing Brown & Cinque-
grana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:  Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 
(1985) (describing how warrantless electronic surveillance has been used by 
the Executive since the mid-1800s). 
 277. U.S. v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).  
 278. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (citing Butenko, 494 F.2d at 605). 
 279. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 280. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d  at  275, (quoting Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 
913 (4th Cir. 1980)).  The Court in Bin Laden also noted the absence of a war-
rant procedure as a justification for the warrant exception under these cir-
cumstances.   
The final consideration which persuades the Court of the need for an 
exception to the warrant requirement for foreign intelligence collec-
tion conducted overseas is that there is presently no statutory basis 
for the issuance of a warrant to conduct searches abroad. . . In addi-
tion, existing warrant procedures and standards are simply not suit-
able for foreign intelligence searches.  
Bin Laden at 275–76.  
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by the imposition of a warrant requirement.281  Therefore, the 
court adopted the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant 
requirement for searches targeting foreign powers or their 
agents, which are conducted abroad.282  The court went on to 
make it clear that this warrant exception applies to a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power and that the duration con-
tinues for as long as the primary purpose of the search is for 
foreign intelligence collection.283  Thus, the defendant’s motion 
to suppress evidence from the physical search of his Kenya 
residence and electronic surveillance was denied.284   
While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed 
the issue of warrantless physical searches in the context of 
FISA, every federal court that has considered the issue has con-
cluded, consistent with the jurisprudence before the 1994 FISA 
amendments, that the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ments are flexible depending on the interests of the government 
at stake.285  Where the governmental interests involve national 
security and the targets of the physical searches and electronic 
surveillance are for the purposes of foreign intelligence collec-
tion, then an exception to the usual warrant requirement is jus-
tified based on the expansive power of the executive branch in 
foreign affairs.   
Through FISA, the Congress and the courts have struck the 
appropriate balance between individual privacy and govern-
mental interests.  They have narrowly set out the circum-
stances under which a surveillance order can be issued and lim-
ited the dissemination of collected information that falls outside 
of the general purpose of the authorized surveillance.  For ex-
ample, warrantless searches are only authorized in the narrow-
est of circumstances and for a limited time period against spe-
cific targets.286  To the extent that a United States person is in-
  
 281. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 278. 
 284. Id. at 288. Cf. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 555 (4th Cir. 
2000) (holding that FISA surveillance was supported by probable cause and 
agents did not exceed scope of search warrant for defendant’s residence). 
 285. See generally Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 237, at 108–09, 114. 
 286. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (1994). 
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volved without his or her consent, minimization procedures 
must be followed.287   
C. The Anticipated Effects of the USA Patriot Act 
1. The Effect of The USA Patriot Act on Civil Liberties 
The national security interests of the U.S. government have 
dramatically changed because of the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.288  In response to the terrorist attacks, Con-
gress has passed several statutes that have been criticized as 
invading individual privacy for the sake of national security.289  
How far can the United States government go to protect na-
tional security?  May it significantly intrude on individual pri-
vacy rights?  The USA Patriot Act makes significant amend-
ments to over fifteen statutes including FISA, Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,290 and the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act.291  The USA 
Patriot Act introduced “sweeping changes”292 to the landscape of 
national security law by amending the following statutes: 
•   The wiretap statute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Contr-     
  ol and Safe Streets Act)293  
• The Electronic Communications Privacy Act294 
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act295 
  
 287. Id. 
 288. David E. Sanger & Steven Weisman, Bush’s Aides Envision New Influ-
ence in Region, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at B11. 
 289. Seth Rosenfeld, 9-11-01; Looking Back, Looking Ahead; A Nation Re-
members; Patriot Act’s Scope, Secrecy Ensnares Innocent, Critics Say, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 8, 2002, at A1. 
 290. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2510 (West 2003). 
 291. International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(1977). 
 292. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15. 
 293. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–2522. (West 2003). 
 294. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 
(West 2003). 
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• The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act296 
• The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute297 
• Money Laundering Control Act298 
• Bank Secrecy Act299 
• Right to Financial Privacy Act300 
• Fair Credit Reporting Act301 
The Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on 
the USA Patriot Act summarizes the statute generally, stating 
that it: 
Give[s] federal law enforcement and intelligence officers 
greater authority (at least temporarily) to gather and share 
evidence from wire and electronic surveillance; amend[s] fed-
eral money laundering laws, particularly those involving over-
seas financial activities; create[s] new federal crimes, in-
creases the penalties for existing federal crimes, and adjusts 
existing federal criminal procedure, particularly with respect 
to acts of terrorism; modifi[es] immigration law [by] increasing 
the ability of federal authorities to prevent foreign terrorists 
from entering the U.S., to detain foreign terrorist suspects, to 
deport foreign terrorists, and to mitigate the adverse immigra-
tion consequences for the foreign victims of September 11; au-
thorize[s] appropriations to enhance the capacity of immigra-
  
 295. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2003). 
 296. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994). 
 297. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121 
(West 2003). 
 298. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2003). 
 299. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311–5330 (West 2003). 
 300. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15. See The Right to Financial Privacy Act 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401–3422 (West 
2003). 
 301. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act supra note 
15.  See The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (a)-(v) (West 2003). 
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tion, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to more effec-
tively respond to the threats of terrorism.302  
The implementation of the USA Patriot Act has met a cool re-
ception by many because of the potential for law enforcement 
abuse.  This concern is captured succinctly by former Clinton 
White House Chief of Staff John Podesta’s observations on the 
Act upon its adoption: 
The events of September 11 convinced…overwhelming majori-
ties in Congress that law enforcement and national security 
officials need new legal tools to fight terrorism.  But we should 
not forget what gave rise to the original opposition-many as-
pects of the bill increase the opportunity for law enforcement 
and the intelligence community to return to an era where they 
monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were 
merely exercising their First Amendment rights.  Nothing that 
occurred on September 11 mandates that we return to such an 
era.303  
Mr. Podesta’s concerns echo the proposition made at the be-
ginning of this Article that the national security legal regime 
has come full circle.  The same concerns that fueled the passage 
of FISA—overzealous law enforcement and intelligence collec-
tion abuse by the executive branch—are now the exact concerns 
levied at The USA Patriot Act’s enforcement.  These concerns 
may lead to significant changes to the USA Patriot Act cur-
rently being considered in the draft amendments titled USA 
Patriot Act II.304  Mr. Podesta is not alone in his concern about 
the enforcement of the USA Patriot Act.  Elliot Mincberg, Legal 
Director for People for the American Way has been very critical 
of Attorney General Ashcroft and the DOJ.305  Mr. Mincberg as-
serts that “what the Justice Department has really done is to 
get things put into the law that have been on prosecutors’ wish 
lists for years.  They’ve used terrorism as a guise to expand law 
  
 302. CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TERRORISM: SECTION BY 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT SUMMARY, (Dec. 10, 2001). 
 303. John Podesta, The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, The Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center, at www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2003). 
 304. See Draft USA Patriot Act II, supra note 27. 
 305. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to 
Swindling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1 and A21 [hereinafter Lichtblau].  
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enforcement powers in areas that are totally unrelated to ter-
rorism.”306  
Senator Russ Feingold, (D-Wisconsin) was the only Senator to 
vote against the Act.307  He was particularly concerned about the 
Act’s impact on civil liberties.  He said: 
Now here’s where my cautions in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks and my concerns over the reach of the anti-terrorism 
bill come together.  To the extent that the expansive new im-
migration powers that the bill grants to the Attorney General 
are subject to abuse, who do we think is most likely to bear the 
brunt of the abuse? It won’t be immigrants from Ireland, it 
won’t be immigrants from El Salvador or Nicaragua it won’t 
even be immigrants from Haiti or Africa.  It will be immi-
grants from Arab, Muslim and South Asian countries.  In the 
wake of these terrible events our [sic] government has been 
given vast new powers and they may fall most heavily on a 
minority of our population who already feel particularly 
acutely the pain of this disaster.308  
The concerns about protection of civil liberties have become 
more pronounced recently in light of the DOJ’s report to Con-
gress in September 2003, citing more than a dozen cases not 
directly related to terrorism that used the USA Patriot Act’s 
tools to gather evidence.309  Many believe the USA Patriot Act 
gives the government too much authority to intrude on individ-
ual privacy.310  Anthony Romero, Executive Director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, said, “Once the American pub-
lic understands that many of the powers granted to the federal 
government apply to much more than just terrorism, I think the 
opposition will gain momentum.”311  Senator Patrick J. Leahy of 
  
 306. Id. 
 307. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act, supra 
note 15. 
 308. Sen. Russell Feingold, Statement on the Anti-Terrorism Bill, (Oct. 25, 
2002), Electronic Privacy Information Center, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
terrorism/usapatriot/feingold.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2003). 
 309. Report to Congress on Implementation of § 1001 of the USA Patriot Act 
(as required by § 1001(3) of Pub. L 107–56) (July 17, 2003), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-07/index.htm; see also Lichtblau, supra note 305, 
at A1. 
 310. Lichtblau, supra note 306, at A1, A21. 
 311. Id. at A21. 
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Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, 
said,  
the government is taking shortcuts around the criminal laws’ 
…we did not intend for the government to shed the traditional 
tools of criminal investigation, such as grand jury subpoenas 
governed by well established precedent and wiretaps strictly 
monitored by federal judges.312 
In contrast, the DOJ, maintains that it is using the expanded 
powers of the USA Patriot Act to fight terrorists.313  Attorney 
General Ashcroft tried to defend the USA Patriot Act in Sep-
tember 2003 saying, “We have used these tools314 to prevent ter-
rorists from unleashing more death and destruction on our 
soil.”315  Thus, the tension between the USA Patriot Act and civil 
liberties has reached a boiling point and may ultimately only be 
resolved by the judiciary.    
2. The Effect of the USA Patriot Act on the Division Between 
the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Community 
The USA Patriot Act also appears to erode the division be-
tween the intelligence and law enforcement communities.316  The 
USA Patriot Act amended FISA to authorize consultation 
among federal law enforcement officers regarding information 
acquired from electronic surveillance or physical searches for 
terrorism and related investigations or protective measures.317  
The FBI is now allowed to request telephone and transactional 
  
 312. Id. (quoting Senator Leahy). 
 313. Id. 
 314. The Act provides enhanced surveillance procedures, such as, permit-
ting the seizure of voice mail messages under a warrant; extending the scope 
of subpoenas for records of electronic communications to include the length of 
service utilized, temporary assigned network addresses, and the means and 
source of payment; providing district courts authority to allow a delay of re-
quired notice to the target of the warrant of the execution of a warrant if im-
mediate notice may have an adverse result; and increasing the duration of 
FISA surveillance of a non-United States person who is an agent of a foreign 
power.  See USA Patriot Act, Pub L. 107–56 §§ 209, 210, 213, 115 Stat. 272, 
283 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)). 
 315. Lichtblau, supra note 305, at A1.  
 316. See id. USA Patriot Act, Pub L. 107–56, § 504, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)). 
 317. USA Patriot Act, Pub L. 107–56, § 504, 115 Stat. 272, 364–365 (to be 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)).  
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records, financial records, and consumer reports in any investi-
gation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities, as long as the investigation is not con-
ducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First 
Amendment.318  Section 216 amends the federal criminal code to 
permit a court, upon application by a United States Attorney, to 
issue an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a 
pen register or trap and trace devices anywhere within the 
U.S.319 The order would apply to any person or entity providing 
wire or electronic communication service in the U.S whose as-
sistance may facilitate execution of an order.320  
Section 403 of the USA Patriot Act also raises individual pri-
vacy concerns.321  It amends the Immigration and Nationality 
Act322 to require the Attorney General and the FBI to provide 
the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (“INS”) with access to specified criminal history 
extracts to determine if an applicant for a visa has a criminal 
history.323  Section 403 also directs the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of State to develop technology standards to identify 
visa applicants.324  This new technology will be the basis for an 
electronic system of law enforcement and intelligence sharing 
available to consular, law enforcement, intelligence and federal 
border inspection personnel.325  The USA Patriot Act further 
amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to broaden the 
scope of aliens ineligible for admission and to allow for the de-
portation of aliens due to terrorist activities.326  Section 414 re-
quires that the Attorney General and Secretary of State imple-
ment an integrated entry and exit data system for airports, 
seaports, and land border ports of entry, with all deliberate 
speed.327  These amendments are additional examples of the dis-
  
 318. Id. § 505, 365–66.  
 319. Id. § 216, 288–90. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. § 403, 343–45. 
 322. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1105 (1952).  
 323. USA Patriot Act, Public Law No. 107–56, § 403, 115 Stat. 272, 343–45.  
 324. Id. § 403, 343–45. 
 325. Id. § 403, 344.  
 326. Id. § 411, 345–50.  
 327. Id. § 414, 353–54. 
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integration of the wall between intelligence collection and law 
enforcement. 
The metaphorical “wall” referred to is the wall between the 
intelligence community and law enforcement that evolved 
through judicial interpretations of FISA.328  The wall concept is 
based on judicial assumptions linked to the statutory minimiza-
tion procedures of FISA.329  These minimization procedures were 
designed to restrict the use of foreign intelligence material col-
lected during electronic surveillance.330  The DOJ explains the 
development of the wall best in its report to Congress: 
The wall between intelligence and law enforcement resulted 
from perceived differences between legal authorities that per-
mit the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to engage in 
electronic surveillance in the course of its foreign counterintel-
ligence function, on the one hand, and its law enforcement 
function  on the other.  These perceived differences created an 
artificial dichotomy between intelligence gathering and law 
enforcement, and FISA and Title III (which authorizes elec-
tronic surveillance in criminal cases).   
As enacted in 1978, FISA required that “the purpose of elec-
tronic surveillance is  to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion,” a term that was (and still is) defined to include informa-
tion necessary to the ability of the United States to “protect” 
against espionage or international terrorism.  [citations omit-
ted]  Courts interpreted “the purpose” to mean “the primary 
purpose,” and they interpreted “foreign intelligence informa-
  
 328. In re Sealed Case No. 02–001, 310 F.3d 717, 720 (Foreign Intel. Surv. 
Rev. Ct. 2002). 
 329. Id. at 721. 
 330. Id.  The FISA Review Court concluded that by minimizing retention,  
Congress intended that “information acquired, which is not necessary 
for obtaining[,] producing, or disseminating foreign intelligence in-
formation, be destroyed where feasible.” [citation omitted].  Further-
more, “[e]ven with respect to information needed for an approved 
purpose, dissemination should be restricted to those officials with a 
need for such information.” [citation omitted]  The minimization pro-
cedures allow, however, the retention and dissemination of non for-
eign intelligence information which is evidence of ordinary crimes for 
preventative or prosecutorial purposes. [citation omitted]  Therefore, 
if through interceptions or searches, evidence of “a serious crime to-
tally unrelated to intelligence matters” is incidentally acquired, the 
evidence is “not…required to be destroyed.”   
Id. at 713. 
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tion” to include information necessary to the ability  of the Uni- 
ted States to protect against espionage or international terror-
ism using methods other than law enforcement.  Thus, accord-
ing to this judicial interpretation of FISA, that statute could 
be used only if the primary purpose of surveillance or a search 
was the protection of national security using non-law enforce-
ment methods; gathering evidence to support the prosecution 
of a foreign  spy or terrorist could be a significant purpose of 
the surveillance or search, but only if that prosecutorial pur-
pose was clearly secondary to the non-law  enforcement pur-
pose. As a practical matter, courts determined the govern-
ment’s purpose for using FISA by examining the degree of co-
ordination between intelligence and law enforcement officials:  
the more information and advice exchanged between these of-
ficials, the more likely courts would be to find that the pri-
mary purpose of the surveillance or search was law enforce-
ment, not intelligence gathering.  This legal structure created 
what the [FISA Review Court] termed “perverse organiza-
tional incentives,” expressly discouraging coordination in the 
fight against terrorism.331  
In order to better obtain untainted FISA surveillance orders, 
the DOJ issued written guidelines in July 1995 that explained 
the necessity of maintaining limited contact between “[d]epa 
rtment personnel involved in foreign intelligence collection and 
those involved in law enforcement.”332  Thus, intelligence infor-
mation could be “shared with prosecutors and criminal investi-
gators only where that information established that a crime has 
been, is being, or will be committed.”333  When these require-
ments were met, “intelligence officials could seek approval to 
‘throw information over the wall.’”334  The decisions regarding 
when to share information, however, rested entirely with intel-
ligence officials, probably those least able to make an informed 
decision regarding what evidence is pertinent to a criminal 
case.335 
  
 331. United States Department of Justice Report to Congress on USA Pa-
triot Act Implementation, at www.house.gov/judiciary/patriotlet051303.pdf at 
13–14 (last visited Sept. 2003) (citation ommitted) [hereinafter DOJ Report].  
 332. Id. at 14. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. 
 335. Id.  The DOJ described the wall arrangement in the following manner: 
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Thus, the wall was effective in preventing cooperation and 
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement, pre-
cisely the opposite of what is necessary in order to respond to 
quickly developing events involving terrorist activities within 
and outside of the U.S.  Before the USA Patriot Act, the wall 
“often precluded effective and vital information sharing be-
tween the intelligence community and law enforcement.”336 The 
wall was the result of a judicial belief that it could approve ap-
plications for electronic surveillance as long as the govern-
ment’s objective was not “primarily” directed toward criminal 
prosecution of foreign agents.337   
The Attorney General addressed this “wall” problem and oth-
ers through provisions of the USA Patriot Act.338  The Act made 
two significant changes to FISA.  First, Section 218 removed the 
“primary purpose” language and replaced it with “a significant 
purpose” standard, permitting the use of FISA when “a signifi-
cant purpose of the search or surveillance was foreign intelli-
gence.”339  Second, the USA Patriot Act made it clear in Section 
504(a) that “coordination between intelligence and criminal 
  
This policy proved to be wholly unworkable, as it entrusted the deci-
sion whether to share information with those who were not best posi-
tioned to apply the applicable standards.  Only the law enforcement 
agents and prosecutors pursuing a particular criminal investigation 
can determine what evidence is pertinent to their case.  In contrast, 
intelligence officials, who focus on the development of foreign intelli-
gence for national security purposes rather than collecting and re-
viewing information for a particular criminal investigation, rarely 
consider the potential evidentiary value of a particular piece of in-
formation, unless such information self-evidently proves that a crime 
has been or may be committed.  Thus, as a matter both of perceived 
legal imperative and of Department culture, it was impossible to 
permit full coordination between intelligence and law-enforcement 
personnel and to combine foreign intelligence and law enforcement 
information into a seamless body of knowledge.  Indeed, law enforce-
ment and intelligence personnel could not speak openly to each other 
and share information beyond the piecemeal sharing envisioned by 
the previously existing rules.  As a result, sharing under these guide-
lines was relatively rare and generally not meaningful. 
Id. at 14. 
 336. Id. at 13.  
 337. Id. at 13–14. 
 338. Id. at 14–15. 
 339. Id. at 15. 
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personnel was not the grounds for denying a FISA applica-
tion.”340  Moreover, after the “enactment of the USA Patriot Act, 
the [Justice] Department promulgated new procedures…that 
expressly authorized — and indeed required — coordination 
between intelligence and law enforcement.”341  The legality of 
these new procedures became the subject of a FISA Court opin-
ion which rejected them in part on May 17, 2002.342  However, 
the new procedures were later approved by the FISA Review 
Court on November 18, 2002.343 
The FISA Review Court held that the wall imposed by the 
various agencies as a result of judicial interpretation was not 
legally required, thus clearing the way for more information 
sharing between law enforcement and intelligence authorities.344 
In the first constitutional test of the USA Patriot Act’s 
amendment to FISA, the FISA Review Court considered the 
issue of whether the FISA Court decision imposing certain re-
quirements and limitations on the grant of a FISA Court sur-
veillance order, was consistent with the statutory requirements 
as amended by the USA Patriot Act.345 
This case involved the request by the Attorney General for 
the FISA Court to “vacate the minimization and ‘wall’ proce-
dures in all cases now or ever before the Court, including the 
Court’s adoption of the Attorney General’s July 1995 intelli-
gence sharing procedures, which are not consistent with new 
intelligence sharing procedures.”346  The FISA Court, though it 
granted the requested surveillance order, imposed restrictions 
which the government contends are not required by FISA.  The 
FISA Court required that the DOJ maintain the wall between 
law enforcement and intelligence collection, notwithstanding 
the USA Patriot Act amendments and the Attorney General’s 
  
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id.  See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
 343. DOJ Report, supra note 331, at 15; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717. 
 344. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720. 
 345. Id. at 719–20. 
 346. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
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new procedures expressly authorizing coordination between 
intelligence and law enforcement.347   
Apparently, the FISA Court was concerned that the DOJ had 
misinterpreted the USA Patriot Act to provide more consulta-
tive authority than it thought FISA allowed.  Accordingly, the 
court fashioned a “chaperone requirement,”348 which provided 
that the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (“OIPR”) be 
invited to all consultative meetings between the FBI and the 
Criminal Division of the DOJ in order to coordinate efforts 
against international terrorism.349  
The FISA Review Court did not agree with the FISA Court’s 
interpretation of FISA.  The FISA Review Court observed that 
the FISA Court’s interpretation was based on an erroneous “as-
sumption that FISA constructed a barrier between counterintel-
ligence/intelligence officials and law enforcement…”350  How-
ever, the FISA Review Court held that the language of the 
statue did not support the assumption.351 It agreed with the gov-
  
 347. Id. at 625.  The FISA Court modified the minimization procedures re-
quested by the government as follows: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, law enforcement officials shall not 
make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initia-
tion, operation, continuation or expansion of FISA searches or sur-
veillances.  Additionally, the FBI and the Criminal Division shall en-
sure that law enforcement officials do not direct or control the use of 
the FISA procedures to enhance criminal  prosecution, and that adv- 
ice intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution does not 
inadvertently result in the Criminal Division’s directing or control-
ling the investigation using FISA searches and surveillances toward 
law enforcement objectives. 
Id. at 625.  The court further held: 
These modifications are intended to bring the minimization proce-
dures into accord with the  language used in the FISA, and reinstate 
the bright line used in the 1995 procedures, on which the  Court has 
relied.  The purpose of minimization procedures as defined in the Act, 
is not to amend  the statute, but to protect the privacy of Americans 
in these highly intrusive surveillances and searches, “consistent with 
the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate for-
eign intelligence information. 
Id.  
 348. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720. 
 349. Id. at 721. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
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ernment’s argument that the judicially imposed wall was nei-
ther supported by the statute nor its legislative history.352  
Moreover, the court also agreed with the government’s alterna-
tive argument that even if the “primary purpose test” was a le-
gitimate construction of FISA prior to the passage of the USA 
Patriot Act, it was no longer a legitimate construction in light of 
the amendments to FISA.353  Furthermore, the “significant pur-
pose” language should now eliminate any doubt that the USA 
Patriot Act intended to allow information sharing whether or 
not the purpose was intelligence collection or criminal prosecu-
tion.354  
The FISA Review Court noted that “it does not seem that 
FISA, at least as originally enacted, even contemplated that the 
FISA Court would inquire into the government’s purpose in 
seeking foreign intelligence information.”355  The FISA Review 
Court noted that Congress required a certification of purpose 
under Section 1804 in order to prevent the practice of targeting 
a foreign power when the purpose of the surveillance was to 
collect information on an individual “for other than foreign in-
telligence purposes.”356  However, Congress placed no restriction 
on the government’s use of collected foreign intelligence infor-
mation to prosecute foreign intelligence crimes.357  Both the 
House and Senate made it clear that prosecution was a way to 
address foreign intelligence crimes.358 
Thus, the FISA Review Court concluded that the FISA Court 
incorrectly continued to rely on the wall concept based on a mis-
interpretation of the statute and the minimization procedures.  
Moreover, the FISA Review Court held that the FISA Court 
continued its erroneous interpretation despite the passage of 
the USA Patriot Act which amended FISA to change “‘the pur-
  
 352. Id. at 723. 
 353. Id. at 734. 
 354. Id. at 734–35. 
 355. Id. at 723.  The FISA Review Court relied on sections 1804 and 1805 
governing the standards a FISA court judge is to use in granting or denying a 
surveillance order.  The Court concluded that nothing in the law required the 
court to inquire into the government’s purpose in seeking foreign intelligence 
information.  Id. 
 356. Id. at 725. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
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pose’ language in 1804(a)(7)(B) to ‘a significant purpose.’”359  The 
USA Patriot Act amendments to FISA “expressly sanctioned 
consultation and coordination between intelligence and law en-
forcement officials.”360  Despite this express provision, the FISA 
Court relied upon the Attorney General’s 1995 procedures as 
minimization procedures and continued to interpret FISA to 
require the wall.361  Now armed with the new USA Patriot Act 
amendments, the Attorney General interpreted FISA much dif-
ferently by approving “new Intelligence Sharing Procedures.”362  
The Attorney General’s new 2002 procedures “supersede[d] 
prior procedures and were designed to permit the complete ex-
change of information and advice between intelligence and law 
enforcement officials.”363  These new procedures “eliminated the 
‘direction and control’ test and allowed the exchange of advice 
between the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division regarding 
‘the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA 
searches or surveillance.’”364  Notwithstanding the Attorney  
General’s position on the new procedures, the FISA Court or-
dered the adoption of the 2002 procedures “with modifications, 
as minimization procedures to apply in all cases.”365 
In light of the legislative history, the FISA Review Court con-
cluded that there was no basis for the FISA Court to rely on the 
statute “to limit criminal prosecutors’ ability to advise FBI in-
telligence officials on the initiation, operation, continuation, or 
  
 359. Id. at 728–29. 
 360. Id. at 729. 
 361. Id. at 730. 
 362. Id. at 729. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. The FISA Review Court held: 
Essentially, the FISA court took portions of the Attorney General’s 
augmented 1995 procedures—adopted to deal with the primary pur-
pose standard—and imposed them generically as minimization pro-
cedures.  In doing so, the FISA court erred.  It did not provide any 
constitutional basis for its action—we think there is none—and mis-
construed the main statutory provision on which it relied.  The court 
mistakenly categorized the augmented 1995 Procedures as FISA 
minimization procedures and then compelled the government to util-
ize a modified version of those procedures in a way that is clearly in-
consistent with the statutory purpose.   
Id. at 730.  The FISA Review Court went on to discuss the statutory definition 
of the minimization procedures and their purpose.  See id. at 731. 
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expansion of FISA surveillances to obtain foreign intelligence 
information, even if such information includes evidence of a for-
eign intelligence crime.”366 
The conclusion reached by the FISA Review Court is sup-
ported by the government’s actions seeking amendment to FISA 
through the USA Patriot Act.  The government, in order to 
avoid the “primary purpose” requirement imposed by the courts 
sought an amendment to section 1804(a)(7)(B) which would only 
require “a purpose” rather than the “primary purpose” lan-
guage.367  Congress settled on the language “a significant pur-
pose” so as not to give the government too much latitude.368  
Congress understood that, with this language, it was relaxing 
the “requirement that the government show that its primary 
purpose [in seeking the surveillance] was other than criminal 
prosecution.”369 
While no committee reports accompanied the USA Patriot 
Act, floor statements in the Senate demonstrate congressional 
intent.370  Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Senate Judiciary Chairman 
said “[t]his bill… break[s] down traditional barriers between 
law enforcement and foreign intelligence.  This is not done just 
to combat international terrorism, but for any criminal investi-
gation that overlaps a broad definition of ‘foreign intelli-
gence.’”371  The FISA Review Court also cited a statement made 
on the floor by Senator Feinstein, a supporter of the USA Pa-
triot Act.372   
  
 366. Id. at 731. 
 367. Id. at 732. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Recognizing that the ultimate object of the USA Patriot Act was to 
make it easier to collect foreign intelligence information under FISA, Senator 
Feinstein said: 
Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is pri-
mary — law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill 
strikes a new balance.  It will now require that a “significant” pur-
pose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to 
proceed with  surveillance under FISA.  The effect of this provision 
will be to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search 
or surveillance warrant for those cases where the subject of the sur-
veillance is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the 
 
File: DavisMacro2.doc Created on:  10/18/2003 6:58 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:34 PM 
228 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
Congress was well aware that the USA Patriot Act would 
break down barriers between intelligence collection and law 
enforcement.373  Senator Feingold expressed concern that the 
“significant purpose” amendment may be used to abuse Fourth 
Amendment protections.374 However, the balance between na-
tional security and civil liberties was struck by Congress in the 
amendments to FISA.  For those who were concerned that the 
amendments gave the government too much power, Senator 
Leahy suggested that “it will be up to the courts to determine 
how far law enforcement agencies may use FISA for criminal 
investigation and prosecution beyond the scope of the statutory 
definition of foreign intelligence information.”375   
Thus, the FISA Review Court correctly concluded that the 
USA Patriot Act amendments to FISA,  
by using the word “significant,” eliminated any justification for 
the FISA Court to balance the relative weight the government 
places on criminal prosecution as compared to other counterin-
telligence responses.  If the certification of the application’s 
purpose articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecu-
tion—such as stopping an ongoing conspiracy—and includes 
other potential non-prosecutorial responses, the government 
meets the statutory test.376   
The FISA Review Court further clarified its point by noting, 
“[o]f course, if the court concluded that the government’s sole 
objective was merely to gain evidence of past criminal conduct—
even foreign intelligence crimes—to punish the agent rather 
than halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity, the application 
should be denied.”377 
  
potential target of a criminal prosecution.  Many of the individuals 
involved in supporting the September 11 attacks may well fall into 
both of these categories.  
Id. at 733 (citing 147 CONG. REC. S10591 (Oct. 11,2003)). 
 373. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 733. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 735. 
 377. Id.  The FISA Review Court added that “ordinary crimes may be inex-
tricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes.”  For example, interna-
tional terrorists may rob banks in order to finance the purchase of weapons of 
mass destruction.  Evidence of the bank robbery should fall under the intelli-
gence collection umbrella.  However, the point is that the FISA process was 
not intended to be used solely as a “device to investigate wholly unrelated 
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3. The Effect on Individual Privacy Concerns 
Armed with the USA Patriot Act, the DOJ, FBI and the intel-
ligence agencies began combating global terrorism.  The USA 
Patriot Act contains enhanced immigration provisions which, 
among other things, expands the “terrorism-related grounds” 
for deportation and permits the Attorney General to detain 
alien terrorist suspects for certain time periods.378  As of Janu-
ary 11, 2002, the DOJ reported the detentions of 725 people.379  
The DOJ released the number of people being detained around 
the U.S, but did not release the names, arrest or custody infor-
mation of the detained.380  Only the nationality, date of arrest, 
legal charge, and date of charging document were released.381  In 
response, advocacy groups including the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (“ACLU”) and the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee have filed lawsuits against the gov-
ernment, demanding information about the detainees and re-
questing they be provided with lawyers.382  These advocacy 
groups have alleged that in more than a dozen instances, thirty 
days had passed between the arrest of a detainee and the actual 
filing of a charge.383  The ACLU and other advocacy groups are 
concerned that the detainees are being denied access to law-
yers.384  Detainees are only allowed visits if the person knows 
the name and alien number of the person.385  However, the DOJ 
will not release this information.386  Therefore, some immigra-
tion lawyers are concerned that many of those detained in the 
terrorism investigation that are not represented by counsel will 
  
ordinary crimes.”  If the law is abused by those charged with its enforcement, 
they can and should be held accountable.  Id. at 736. 
 378. H.R. Res. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 379. Tamar Lewin, A Nation Challenged: The Detainees; Rights Groups 
Press for Names of Muslims Held in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at 
A9.  
 380. Id.  
 381. Id.  
 382. Id.  
 383. Id.  
 384. Id.  
 385. Id.  
 386. Id.  
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agree to deportation as the quickest way to get out of jail.387  One 
of the few ways immigration lawyers can help those detained is 
by giving “know your rights” presentations in jail.388   
In its review of the USA Patriot Act, the ACLU criticized the 
Act as compromising Fourth Amendment protections.  The 
ACLU argued that the Act eviscerated the probable cause re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment,389 limited judicial over-
sight of telephone and internet surveillance,390 put the CIA back 
in the business of spying on Americans,391 and allowed for deten-
tion and deportation of people engaging in innocent associa-
tional activity.392  
The ACLU argues that the USA Patriot Act limits judicial 
oversight of electronic surveillance by changing current law.393  
The ACLU contends that the low hurdle required to get tele-
phone numbers traced during an ongoing criminal investigation 
is now imported, through the USA Patriot Act, to internet 
communications which involve more content than just tele-
phone numbers alone.394  Under current law, in order to obtain a 
pen register or trap and trace order, a law enforcement officer 
need only certify that the information sought is “relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.” 395  The order requires a “tele-
  
 387. Id.  
 388. Id. 
 389. ACLU Freedom Network, How the USA Patriot Act Enables Law En-
forcement to Use Intelligence Authorities to Circumvent the Privacy Protections 
Afforded in Criminal Cases (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/ 
1102301i.html [hereinafter Circumventing Privacy Protections]. 
 390. ACLU Freedom Network, How the USA Patriot Act Limits Judicial 
Oversight of Telephone and Internet Surveillance (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://arch 
ive.aclu.org/congress/1102301g.html [hereinafter Judicial Oversight]. 
 391. ACLU Freedom Network, How the USA Patriot Act Puts the CIA Back 
in the Business of Spying on Americans (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://archive.aclu. 
org/congress/1102301g.html [hereinafter Business of Spying on Americans]. 
 392. ACLU Freedom Network, How the USA Patriot Act Allows for Deten-
tion and Deportation of People Engaging in Innocent Associational Activity 
(Oct. 23, 2001), at http://archive.aclu.org/congress/1102301h.html [hereinafter 
Detention and Deportation of People]. 
 393. American Civil Liberties Union, Surveillance Under the USA Patriot 
Act, (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/Safeand Free/SafeandFree.cfm? 
ID=12263&c=206. 
 394. Nancy Chang, The USA Patriot Act: What’s So Patriotic About Tram-
pling on The Bill of Rights, Center for Constitutional Rights, at 5 http://www. 
ccr-ny.org/vz/Whatsnews/USA_Patriot_Act.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003). 
 395. Judicial Oversight, supra note 390. 
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phone company to reveal the ‘numbers dialed’ to and from a 
particular telephone.”396  Under Section 216 of the USA Patriot 
Act, the judge has no discretion and “must grant the order upon 
receiving the certification.”397  “Section 216 of the USA Patriot 
Act…extend[s] this low threshold of proof to internet communi-
cations…”398  These communications reveal more content than 
simply the numbers dialed to or from a telephone.399  Unlike 
with telephone calls, the email address cannot always be easily 
separated from the content of the message.400 
The ACLU also criticizes the USA Patriot Act for putting the 
CIA back in the business of spying on American citizens.401  This 
concern is based on the fact that the FBI, CIA and NSA spied 
on student activists and others who opposed the war in Vietnam 
during the 1960s and 1970s.402  FISA was passed in response to 
this abuse of power.403  The USA Patriot Act “permits wide shar-
ing of sensitive information gathered in criminal investigations 
by law enforcement agencies with intelligence agencies includ-
ing the CIA, and the NSA, and other federal agencies including 
the INS, Secret Service and Department of Defense.”404  The 
ACLU fears that the USA Patriot Act gives the government a 
dangerously enhanced role in domestic intelligence gathering 
against U.S citizens,405 a role that is “contrary to the statutory 
prohibition in the CIA charter barring it from engaging” in do-
mestic security operations.406 
Additionally, the ACLU contends that the Act allows for the 
deportation of people who engage in innocent First Amendment 
associational activity.407  Current law under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”)408 permits the Secretary of State to 
  
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id.  
 400. Id. 
 401. Business of Spying on Americans, supra note 391. 
 402. Id.  
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id.  See also 50 U.S.C. § 403(3)(d)(1). 
 407. Detention and Deportation of People, supra note 392.  
 408. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 88–414, 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C §§ 1101–1537 (2003)). 
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designate foreign groups with various procedural safeguards. 409  
Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act “adds a new provision to 
INA Section 212(a)(3)(B) that permits designation of foreign 
and domestic groups without those procedural safeguards.”410  
The ACLU contends that the USA Patriot Act creates a high 
risk of deporting innocent people for innocent associational ac-
tivity with political groups that the government identifies as 
terrorist organizations.411  Moreover, the ACLU argues that the 
Act puts the burden on the immigrant to prove that he did not 
know that his assistance would further terrorist activity.412  The 
ACLU contends that this raises the specter of punishing inno-
cent people for association with unpopular causes and is remi-
niscent of McCarthyism.413 
While the ACLU’s concerns are valid, they do not accurately 
reflect the intent of the legislative provisions or their operation.  
The USA Patriot Act enhances the ability of our intelligence 
and law enforcement communities to detect and prevent terror-
ist attacks. 
Before the USA Patriot Act was adopted, local courts could 
only authorize wiretaps within the jurisdiction of the court.414  
Search warrants issued for email communications could not 
extend beyond the jurisdiction of the court issuing it.415  For ex-
ample, if a court in Tampa ordered a search warrant on Wile E. 
  
 409. Detention and Deportation of People, supra note 392. 
 410. Id. The ACLU states:  
Under this new power, the Secretary of State could designate any 
group that has ever engaged in violent activity a “terrorist organiza-
tion”— whether it be Operation Rescue, Greenpeace, or People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals.  The designation would render the 
group’s non-citizen members inadmissible to the United States, and 
would make payment of membership dues a deportable offense.  Un-
der the [Act], people can be deported regardless of whether they knew 
of the designation and regardless of whether their assistance had 
anything to do with the group’s alleged terrorist activity. 
Id.  See also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101–1537. (West 
2003).  
 411. Detention and Deportation of People, supra note 392. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Brigitte Anderson, Backward March! The USA Patriot Act and the Bill 
or Rights, at http://mtprof.msun.edu/Spr2002/BAWRart.html (last visited Oct. 
4, 2003); see also H.R. Res. 3162, 107th Cong. §§ 206, 216–20 (2001). 
 415. See id. 
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Hacker, and during the course of the investigation a new email 
account is discovered on an internet service provider in San 
Francisco, law enforcement had no right to search that email 
account without obtaining an additional search warrant for that 
jurisdiction.416  The USA Patriot Act changed these limitations 
by giving the courts permission to compel assistance from any 
communications provider in the U.S whose assistance is appro-
priate to further an investigation.417  This allows federal investi-
gators authority to execute the same search warrant on any 
downstream communication provider, regardless of the state in 
which it is operating.  
Before the USA Patriot Act, the use of voice communications 
in email created a quandary for law enforcement because voice 
communications were protected by much more restrictive wire-
tap orders.418  Law enforcement officers, even with a subpoena, 
could acquire a limited amount of information from an internet 
service provider.419  Moreover, the Cable Act420 set out an ex-
tremely restrictive set of rules governing law enforcement ac-
cess to records held by local cable companies.421  After adoption 
of the USA Patriot Act, law enforcement can obtain voice mail 
and other stored voice communications once a search warrant 
has been authorized.422  The Act significantly expands the data 
that can be obtained from an internet service provider.423  The 
Cable Act has also been amended to allow law enforcement to 
subpoena customer records without notification to the cus-
tomer.424 
Moreover, Sections 214 and 215 of the USA Patriot Act had 
the impact of liberalizing the use of pen register and trap and 
trace devices in addition to allowing law enforcement to require 
  
 416. See id. 
 417. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act, supra 
note 15.  
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. The Cable Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2003).  
 421. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The USA Patriot Act, supra 
note 15. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Judicial Oversight, supra note 390. 
 424. Electronic Information Privacy Center, USA Patriot Act, supra note 15. 
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the production of any tangible things relevant to an interna-
tional terrorism investigation.425 
Thus, the USA Patriot Act, through sweeping changes to ex-
isting law, removed many of the restraints on law enforcement 
that impeded investigation and apprehension of international 
terrorists.  Significantly, the USA Patriot Act contains a sunset 
provision which operates to expire many of the “amendments 
enhancing surveillance authority on December 31, 2005.”426  
Congress understood the concerns regarding enhanced govern-
ment authority contained in the USA Patriot Act and provided 
for a reasonable amount of time within which to test the Act’s 
application.427  Congress is currently reviewing a draft USA Pa-
triot Act II consistent with its commitment to monitor the im-
plementation of the current Act.428  Therefore, while the ACLU 
argues that any encroachment on the rights of citizens is cause 
for concern, the legislative efforts embodied in the USA Patriot 
Act are reasonable responses to the threat of terrorism. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a nation we are on the right track in combating terrorism.  
The legislative efforts of Congress are reasonable responses to 
an attack on the principles of freedom and self-determination.  
However, we will make mistakes as we address issues that we 
have not confronted before.  A few observations illustrate this 
point.  First, the nation is undergoing profound changes regard-
ing personal and national security and in terms of its organiza-
tional and operational structure.  The administration has un-
dertaken a review of the FBI, CIA, NSA and established a De-
partment of Homeland Security.  Second, this country is on the 
cutting edge of the law.  We are confronting novel legal issues 
that we have never directly addressed before in the context of a 
war against terrorism.  Third, we are fighting a “war” that is 
unlike any war that we have ever fought before.  We have no 
  
 425. Id.  See also Circumventing Privacy Protections, supra note 389. 
 426. Electronic Information Privacy Center, USA Patriot Act, supra note 15. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Patriot Act II (draft) (Jan. 9, 2003), at 
www.eff.org/censorship/terrorism_militias/patriot2draft.html (last visited Feb. 
10, 2003).  
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enemy government and a global battlefield.  In essence, the is-
sues that we face are law shaping events. 
We are shaping the law as the issues are presented, and un-
der such circumstances there will be considerable disagreement 
over the appropriate course of action to take.  The following rec-
ommendations nonetheless seem reasonable: 
• Review the implementation of the USA Patriot Act and 
other laws to ensure that civil liberties are not under-
mined. 
• Aggressively prosecute any violation of civil liberties or 
misuse of the laws passed to fight the war against terror-
ism. 
• Place a sunset provision in all legislation passed in re-
sponse to the war on terrorism and focus on those provi-
sions that provide expanded powers to the U.S. Govern-
ment. 
• Ensure that the next wave of legislation goes through the 
full legislative process including full committee hearings 
and debate. 
• Use the current Patriot Act to inform the development of 
USA Patriot Act II.  
• Integrate the findings of the DOJ Report submitted to 
Congress in September 2003 regarding the implementa-
tion of USA Patriot Act I. 
• Study the DOJ report, and make any abuses identified by 
it the focal point for amendments, revisions and new legis-
lation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The events of September 11th are hopefully the most horrific 
events many of us will ever have to live through.  The admini-
stration declared that the terrorists responsible have committed 
an act of war.429  The President advised the men and women in 
uniform to “get ready.”430  Indeed, the war against terrorism di-
  
 429. R.W. Apple Jr., After the Attacks: News Analysis; No Middle Ground, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1.  
 430. James Risen, After the Attacks: The Trail; Bush Tells the Military to 
“Get Ready”; Broader Spy Powers Gaining Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2001, at A1 [hereinafter Risen]. 
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rected initially at Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Taliban gov-
ernment has been successful.  The Taliban are no longer in 
power and some of Al Qaeda have been captured or killed.  
These terrorist attacks provide the best explanation for why the 
Fourth Amendment must be flexible when the government is 
engaged in foreign intelligence collection efforts.  The United 
States Congress has passed a resolution authorizing the Presi-
dent to use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist  attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the  United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons.431   
Additionally, as a result of the terrorist attacks, President 
Bush declared the U.S to be in a state of national emergency 
pursuant to the National Emergencies Act,432 and by Executive 
Order authorized the Secretary of Defense to order up members 
of the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to respond to the con-
tinuing and immediate threat of further terrorist attacks.433 
President Bush indicated that the war against terrorism will 
not stop in Afghanistan, but will seek to destroy terrorists and 
those who support them wherever they may be.434 Thus, the U.S. 
took the war on terrorism to Iraq, removed Saddam Hussein 
and his regime, and is now helping the Iraqi people to assume 
responsibility for their own future.435 
More rigorous security measures are being implemented at 
the airports and Congress is now considering whether certain 
  
 431. Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force Against Terrorism, S.J. 
Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 432. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). 
 433. See Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sept. 14, 2001); Exec. 
Order No. 13,253, 67 Fed. Reg. 2791 (Jan. 16, 2002). 
 434. Joseph Curl, Bush Advises Patience, Resolve in Extended War Against 
Terror, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A3.  
 435. The United States Department of State, White House Progress Report 
on Global War Against Terrorism, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror  
(last visited Sept. 28, 2003).  
File: DavisMacro2.doc Created on: 10/18/2003 6:58 PM Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:34 PM 
2003] CIVIL LIBERTIES 237 
restrictions in place against assassinations should be lifted.436  
America has changed.  R. James Woolsey, the former director of 
CIA said that “Washington has absolutely undergone a sea 
change in thinking . . . .”437  Congressional leaders and those 
who oversee the national intelligence agencies are discussing 
ways to allow the intelligence agencies to combat terrorism 
more aggressively.438  Congressional intelligence oversight com-
mittee leadership and former directors of the CIA now say Con-
gress should consider easing some of the restrictions that have 
been placed on the intelligence agencies.439  The terrorist attacks 
have provided a catalyst for change in the attitude of political 
leadership.  The attitude now is reflected in comments like 
those of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Republican from Alabama 
and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who 
says, “we have got to be a hell of a lot more aggressive.”440  For-
mer President George H. W. Bush, who served as director of the 
CIA under President Ford also commented about the “need to 
free up the intelligence system from some of its constraints.”441   
Thus, we have perhaps come full circle.  This Article began 
with a review of the report of the Church Committee investiga-
tion and concerns of executive branch and intelligence agency 
abuse that led to the passage of FISA and implementation of 
Executive Order 12,333.  These legislative and executive meas-
ures were meant to constrain the activities of the intelligence 
agencies and provide clear guidance on the constitutional limits 
of foreign and domestic surveillance.  Today, because of the ter-
rorist attacks the intelligence agencies will once again become a 
focal point as the U.S. searches for answers to the questions of 
why the intelligence community was not able to prevent at-
tacks.  It is possible, indeed likely that legislative solutions will 
be proposed to now untie the hands of the intelligence commu-
nity in ways that may make it better able to combat terrorism. 
  
 436. Exec. Order No., 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (2000).  Executive Order 12,333 § 2.11 provides that:  “No person 
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage 
in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”  Id. 
 437. Risen, supra note 430, at A1. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id.  
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These are precisely the questions that were debated as the USA 
Patriot Act was considered and ultimately passed into law.  
Some suggest that the USA Patriot Act is the most dangerous 
kind of law, a law that was passed in the heat of emotion and in 
reaction to a terrible tragedy.  Once again, the question of strik-
ing the balance between national security and the Fourth 
Amendment will be center stage. However, now the context is 
not domestic surveillance of individuals, organizations and 
watch lists, but rather terrorism.  
The appropriate balance between protecting the nation and 
civil liberties has been reached through the Congressional legis-
lative efforts in its attempt to make it easier to combat terror-
ism.  The genius of democratic society is that, though the sys-
tem is not perfect, it does work.  The constitutional checks and 
balances operate well to curtail overzealous executive, legisla-
tive or judicial activity regardless of the catalyst for overzeal-
ousness.  As the Fourth Amendment cases have held, the pur-
pose of the criminal law is to punish and deter crime.  However, 
the purpose of intelligence collection is “stop or frustrate the 
immediate criminal activity.”442  The cases reviewed in this Arti-
cle have found that the Congress struck an appropriate balance 
between national security and Fourth Amendment privacy con-
cerns.   
In the final analysis, it becomes very difficult to preserve civil 
liberties if the survival of the nation is in the balance.  Without 
a secure nation, civil liberty becomes a function of those in con-
trol of the government.  Thus, by preserving the nation we are 
better able to preserve freedom. 
  
 442. In re Sealed Case No. 02–001, 310 F.3d at 744 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 
2002). 
